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International Price and Earnings Momentum
Abstract
We find that price and earnings momentum are pervasive features of international equity
markets even when controlling for data snooping biases. For European countries, we find that
price momentum is subsumed by earnings momentum on an aggregate level. However, this
rationale does not apply to each and every country. While the above explanation is confined
to certain time periods in the U.S., earnings momentum nevertheless appears to be a crucial
driver of the price momentum anomaly in many markets. In fact, we find momentum profits
to be more pronounced for portfolios characterized by higher information uncertainty. Hence,
the momentum anomaly may well be rationalized in a model of investors underreacting to
fundamental news. Finally, we find that momentum works better when limited to stocks
with high idiosyncratic risk or higher illiquidity, suggesting that limits to arbitrage deter
rational investors from exploiting the anomaly.
Keywords: Earnings Momentum, Price Momentum, Market Efficiency, Multiple Hypotheses
Testing, Information Uncertainty, Liquidity
JEL Classification: G11; G12; G14; M40
According to the Oxford Dictionary momentum is a force that is gained by movement. Price
momentum entails the observation that past winning stocks continue to deliver superior returns
in the short run while past losing stocks subsequently continue to disappoint. Likewise, earnings
momentum refers to the observation of momentum in stock prices following the direction of
analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. Both phenomena have been documented for the U.S.
by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) in the early
nineties. Moreover, Rouwenhorst (1998) and Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003, 2005) evidence that
the momentum effect carries over to many developed international markets in terms of magnitude
and persistence.
Within this paper we confirm that price and earnings momentum are constantly defying
capital market efficiency in international equity markets. Usually, this observation is being
rationalized by either risk-based or behavioral-based explanations. However, such explanations
are only meaningful if the momentum anomaly is not spurious in the first place. Especially,
when a vast number of strategies is being tested around the globe, some strategies tested may
excel by chance alone. Statistically speaking, there is a need to control for data snooping biases
given the multitude of tests involved. While researchers have long been aware of data snooping
biases,1 common statistical procedures are not always optimal in terms of power, and hence they
are most likely to reject any given anomaly. However, we aim to detect as many countries as
possible where the momentum anomaly actually exists. We therefore employ the recent proposal
of Romano and Wolf (2005), which achieves improvements in power due to its stepwise nature
and use of studentized test statistics. While Leippold and Lohre (2010a, 2010b) document that
Sloan (1996)’s accrual anomaly and the dispersion effect of Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)
are not robust to this battery of tests, we find that both price and earnings momentum are fairly
persistent with regard to data snooping biases. Hence, the phenomenon is even more intriguing
and the need for a sound economic explanation of the origins of momentum is apparent.
In examining the link between both momentum anomalies, we test the recent conjecture of
Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) who claim that price momentum is merely a noisy proxy for
earnings momentum in the U.S.. This explanation is intuitive, since price momentum may well
be rationalized in a model of investors underreacting to fundamental news as represented by
1See Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999), and White (2000).
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earnings revisions. Along this line of reasoning, we check whether this explanation constitutes
a broad pattern in a large sample of 16 European countries. Our findings are as follows. First,
while we replicate the result of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), the conjectured pattern has
recently become more subtle. During the market frenzy at the end of the nineties, we observe
a decoupling of price and earnings momentum in the U.S., which suggests that this period may
be dominated by investors’ over- instead of underreaction. Second, considering an aggregate
European momentum strategy, we find that European price momentum appears to be a mani-
festation of earnings momentum throughout the whole twenty-year sample period. Third, while
we cannot replicate this argument in all European countries, there is considerable evidence that
earnings momentum is a crucial determinant in explaining price momentum for most countries.
Having established a link between both anomalies, we are still in need of a deeper rationale
for the momentum effect. In further examining the international momentum phenomena, we
fail to establish momentum as a proxy for macroeconomic risk. Rather supporting a behavioral-
based argument, we find momentum strategies to be most profitable when restricted to winner
and loser portfolios characterized by proxies of high information uncertainty. In other words,
the noisier the fundamental information, the slower its incorporation into prices, which is in
accordance with underreaction of investors.
Regardless of the origins of momentum, be it risk or behavioral biases, it is most puzzling
why the anomaly is not arbitraged away. While various market anomalies are found to falter
following their publication, see Schwert (2003), momentum does not. To explain this observation,
Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) and Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) detect trading costs to be the
single most important impediment to successfully implement momentum strategies in the U.S..
The amount of trading costs is not only driven by the huge turnover but also by liquidity risk.
Hence, Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka, and Shivakumar (2009) accordingly find the post-earnings-
announcement drift to be confined to illiquid securities. Even more so, Liu (2006) constructs a
liquidity-augmented asset pricing model that almost captures the abnormal returns of standard
U.S. price momentum strategies. In a related vein, Arena, Haggard, and Yan (2008) resolve this
puzzle for the U.S. by showing that momentum profits are especially pronounced for stocks with
high idiosyncratic volatility which suggests that the momentum phenomenon persists, since any
arbitrageur wishing to exploit the anomaly is limited by high arbitrage costs. In substantiating
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this claim, we provide additional evidence that international momentum strategies appear to be
mostly limited to highly illiquid stocks.
The paper’s structure is as follows. In Section 1, we review prior evidence on the momentum
anomalies both in the U.S. and in European markets. Section 2 presents the data we use for our
study. In Section 3, we establish the traditional analysis of momentum anomalies in European
equity markets. In Section 4, we subject both anomalies to recent methods of multiple testing.
Section 5 examines the interplay of both anomalies. Section 6 further explores the link of
momentum to the macroeconomy and its interaction with information uncertainty and liquidity.
Section 7 concludes.
1. Review of Momentum Strategies
1.1. Price Momentum
Momentum in individual stock prices has first been documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
and their approach of quantifying price momentum has become the industry standard. They
consider a portfolio that is long in the winner decile and short in the loser decile. These decile
portfolios arise from several winner and loser portfolios based on overlapping time periods. The
stocks are ranked monthly according to their performance over the last six months and assigned
accordingly to the respective decile portfolios. These are held for six months. Hence, the winner
or loser decile of the associated price momentum strategy of a given month is made up of six
portfolios. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find such a price momentum strategy to earn more
than 1% above the risk-free rate per month. Even though the decile portfolios usually consist
of smaller sized companies with high beta risk, the associated hedge strategy’s return cannot be
fully explained by significant size or market exposure. The fact that the momentum anomaly is
not arbitraged away and still persists is even more intriguing, see Jegadeesh and Titman (2001).
In explaining the phenomenon of U.S. price momentum, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) exam-
ine post-holding period return patterns of momentum portfolios. These patterns favor a behav-
ioral explanation of momentum to be triggered from market participants’ under- or overreaction
to new information. Overreaction will drive stock prices to levels that are not fundamentally
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justified, giving rise to a subsequent reversion back to their initial level. On the other hand,
given limited information processing capabilities, investors may underreact to news which may
positively effect a company’s fundamental value. Since overconfidence likely causes investors to
cling to their original views, this fundamental news may only gradually transmit into the com-
pany’s stock price. In this case, one obtains a flat post-holding period return of a momentum
strategy.
Not only is the price momentum anomaly confined to the U.S., it has also been documented
in several international studies, such as in Rouwenhorst (1998) for Europe and more recently
in Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003, 2005) for a large set of countries. While Rouwenhorst (1999)
finds emerging markets to exhibit price momentum, Bekaert, Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1997)
contend that momentum in these markets are less consistently profitable.
1.2. Earnings Momentum
Ball and Brown (1968) have first documented the phenomenon of post-earnings announcement
drift which encompasses the tendency of stock prices to drift in the direction suggested by recent
earnings surprises. This observation is most likely driven by investors of bounded rationality
failing to fully appreciate the earnings information, which results in a delayed price response,
see Bernard and Thomas (1989). While studies on the post-earnings announcement drift rely on
some measure of realized earnings surprise, one may also resort to analysts’ earnings forecasts as a
more direct measure of earnings expectations. Doing so provides a more timely measure, given
that non-U.S. companies usually report earnings on an annual basis as opposed to quarterly
reporting. The investment strategy building on the above metric is typically referred to as
earnings momentum.
The implementation of the earnings momentum strategy is similar to the one of price momen-
tum. However, companies are not being ranked dependent on the level of prior returns but prior
earnings revisions. As in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), we build a moving average
of cumulated revisions over the prior six months to capture the change in earnings expectations:
REV 6it =
6∑
j=0
fit−j − fit−j−1
pit−j−1
(1)
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where fit is the consensus estimate in month t of the i-th company’s earnings for the current
fiscal year, as provided by the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). The resulting
difference, the monthly revision, is then scaled by the prior month’s stock price. We go long
in the highest earnings revisions quintile and short in the lowest quintile in any given month
according to the value of REV 6it. Given a holding period of six months the resulting hedge
strategy’s long leg consists of six overlapping portfolios, as does the short leg.
1.3. Linking Price and Earnings Momentum
It is straightforward to speculate as to whether price and earnings momentum may reflect the
very same mispricing or behavioral bias. In fact, prior studies like Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakon-
ishok (1996) find that the U.S. momentum effect is concentrated around subsequent earnings
announcements and show that price momentum may partially be explained by underreaction to
earnings information. However, they contend that price momentum is not subsumed by earn-
ings momentum, since each ranking variable has some incremental predictive power for future
returns. This view is shared by Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2005), who analyze both momentum
strategies in an international context. Given that Hong and Swaminathan (2003) only detect
price momentum in countries that also exhibit earnings momentum nevertheless makes the case
for a closer relation of the two anomalies. Indeed, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) show that
U.S. price momentum appears to be a manifestation of earnings momentum for the period from
1972 to 1999.
2. Data
2.1. Sample Selection
We use a comprehensive sample of companies domiciled in 17 equity markets, 16 European
markets and the U.S., covering the period from January 1988 to March 2009. All data has been
gathered from Datastream including I/B/E/S earnings revisions data.
Table 1 contains information on the sample countries classified by region. We collect com-
panies for each country by merging the live and dead research lists provided by Datastream
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and thereby obtain a total number of 65,925 companies. To arrive at our final sample, we have
pruned the initial country research lists as follows. First, we adjust each country list for sec-
ondary issues and cross-country listings to prevent double-counting. In particular, we extract
30,552 companies. Hence, only one half of the initial list does refer to major listings. Second,
we screen for non-equity issues, i.e., we exclude investment trusts, ADRs, and the like. Third,
we also exclude OTC stocks and stocks that are only listed on regional exchanges. Following
these two screens, we are left with 16,662 companies. We further exclude those having market
capitalization below 10 million USD, which leaves us with a final sample of 13,291 companies.
Almost one half are U.S. companies and the biggest five markets comprise some 80%. To avoid
survivorship bias, the sample includes 4,550 “dead” companies, i.e., one third of the whole sam-
ple, ranging from 16.9% for Greece to 52.2% for Portugal. The label “dead” applies to companies
in extreme distress and to those being merged, delisted, or converted.
Since we aim to investigate price and earnings momentum strategies, we additionally check
the coverage of return and earnings revisions data. Unsurprisingly, the coverage for return data
is close to 100% in each country, on average 98.4% of the companies do exhibit at least one
return observation over the course of the sample period. As for the earnings estimates, these
figures are more fragmentary. However, the average coverage still amounts to 75.5% spanning a
range from 62.6% (Belgium) to 94.1% (Spain). Note that our sample contains a certain amount
of penny stocks that will not be included in the momentum strategies. We do not discard them
right away, since being a penny stock is not a static firm characteristic. In particular, we do not
invest in companies with stock price below 5$ at the beginning of a given month.
2.2. Return Data
We consider monthly stock returns in local currency inclusive of dividends by employing total
return figures. To represent the respective markets, we choose broad market indices as compiled
by Datastream and 3-month-T-bills serve as a proxy for the risk-free rate.
Ince and Porter (2006) show that the price momentum effect cannot be detected in the
U.S. when na¨ıvely using raw Datastream data, an observation that appears to extend to other
international markets as well, see Lohre (2008). For curing these data issues, Ince and Porter
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(2006) propose two major adjustments. One is to remove non-common equity from the respective
country research lists and the other is to screen for irregular return patterns. Since the former
has already been dealt with when deleting secondary issues, we merely have to address the
quality of return data. We follow Ince and Porter (2006) in adjusting the return data to allow
for reasonable statistical and economic inferences.
Interestingly, we find our comprehensive sample to be hardly confounded by erroneous return
data. For instance, the U.S. only requires to change 161 return observations which represents
0.01% of all observations. This fraction is even smaller for Europe for which we adjust 69
observations across all 16 countries. We assume that Datastream has significantly corrected
the database in response to the objections of Ince and Porter (2006).2 Still, the remaining
issues might severely affect statistical inferences and weeding them out renders us even more
comfortable with the quality of data.
3. Detecting Price and Earnings Momentum
3.1. Risk and Return
We next report descriptive statistics of momentum-based quintile portfolios by country. In
computing momentum portfolio returns, we follow the standard approach of Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) that stipulates the use of overlapping portfolios as described in the previous
section.3 Tables 2 and 3 give average monthly buy-and-hold return and volatility figures together
with two risk proxies, size and beta.
First, we assess the profitability of the price momentum hedge strategy by considering the
return differential along with its t-statistic. For the U.S., we obtain a monthly hedge return of
72 basis points at a monthly volatility of 3.9% giving rise to a t-statistic of 2.99. The latter is
even higher for the European hedge strategy providing a return of 111 basis points per month
but at a lower volatility. Further, using the t-statistic metric, we identify 13 European countries
2In fact, according to an employee of Thomson Financial Services the return time series is constantly screened
for possible glitches in the price, dividend, and adjustment factor history. In particular, the history of several
U.S. OTC stocks has been fixed recently, which presumably accounted for a lot of issues detected by Ince and
Porter (2006).
3Note that we are using quintile instead of decile portfolios.
7
that have anomalous returns on a 5% level or better. If we relax the significance level to 10%,
Ireland and Sweden appear to be anomalous as well, leaving Portugal as the only country for
which price momentum is not significant, albeit positive. All in all, we recover prior evidence of
pronounced international momentum effects as documented by Rouwenhorst (1998) and Griffin,
Ji, and Martin (2003, 2005).
The loser quintile is likewise contributing to the return spread as the winner quintile. This
finding confirms prior evidence that a long-only investor may well benefit from an according
momentum strategy. However, the extreme quintile portfolios are the riskiest within all coun-
tries, since the winner and loser portfolios prove to be more volatile than the portfolios with less
extreme price momentum. To judge a systematic risk bias of these portfolios, we compute betas
according to the classical regression
Rit −RFt = αi + βi(RMt −RFt) + εit, (2)
where Rit denotes the return of quintile i, RFt is the risk-free rate and RMt is the market return
of the respective country. For more than half of the countries, the extreme quintile portfolios
exhibit high betas, while the remaining portfolios appear to be homogeneous in terms of beta.
Moreover, in 16 countries we obtain the highest betas for the loser quintile. Also, there is a
size bias for the two extreme quintile portfolios. When we examine size, measured in terms of
the logarithm of market value, we find that the two extreme portfolios are mostly populated by
smaller companies. Again, the bias is more severe in the loser quintile, which may in turn explain
its conspicuous market exposure. Concerning the price momentum strategy, we usually observe
betas that are slightly negative suggesting that one may partially hedge against downside moves
of the market.
Regarding earnings momentum, the U.S. strategy earns 46 basis points per month at a
volatility that is almost half the size of the price momentum volatility. Thus, the according
t-statistic of 3.12 is similar. On the other hand, the European earnings momentum strategy
exhibits improved risk-adjusted performance with a return of 76 basis points per month at
1.65% volatility, giving a t-statistic of 7.42. Across Europe, Tables 2 and 3 give rise to 15
significant return differentials while the remaining countries also show positive differentials.
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However, there is no general pattern of price momentum outperforming earnings momentum in
terms of return at the cost of higher volatility. Both, price and earnings momentum strategies
are rather volatile and risk-mitigating effects with regard to market volatility do only occur in
some countries. Compared to price momentum, these earnings momentum differentials seem to
be driven less often by the short leg. This is a a comforting result since the earnings momentum
losers are seriously more volatile than the winners. Even though the long leg has a severe
size bias it exhibits less extreme beta exposure than the short leg of the earnings momentum
strategy. Also, the earnings momentum strategy exhibits negative betas that are usually smaller
in absolute terms than those of the according price momentum strategy.
[Fig. 1 about here.]
In the upper graphs of Figure 1, we plot the cumulative returns of the winner and loser quin-
tiles of the earnings and price momentum strategies together with the evolution of an equally-
weighted market portfolio. Inspecting the cumulative wealth of the extreme quintiles for the
U.S., we support the findings of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), namely that price and earn-
ings momentum are closely related. For both price and earnings momentum, the respective
winner portfolios move almost in sync. However, the price momentum losers underperform the
earnings momentum losers In addition, the loser portfolio stays well below the market portfolio
and the winner portfolio stays well above it. We observe slightly different behavior in Europe.
Both legs of the price momentum strategy seem to be closely related to the earnings momentum
counterparts, however, they are shifted upwards.
Also, inspecting the cumulative momentum returns for the U.S. and Europe over time in the
lower graphs of Figure 1 confirms the above statements. Both, price and earnings momentum,
seem to be closely tied. Over the nineties, the respective return paths nearly coincide. However,
the earnings momentum strategy is smoother. While this observation has already been apparent
from the descriptive statistics, we additionally learn that the higher volatility figures mainly arise
over an extended but limited period following the burst of the technology bubble in 1999. Hence,
though usually sailing in safe waters, a price momentum investor may experience very turbulent
times with volatility well in excess of common market levels. Of course, the most recent financial
crises also represents a very challenging environment for momentum investors that have suffered
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from rather devastating returns, especially in March 2009, which is the last observation in our
sample period.
3.2. Time-Series Regressions
Since most of the hedge strategies are highly volatile, we wonder whether their high returns are
solely compensating for risk. To further examine the performance of our strategies, we therefore
check if the long-short portfolio returns can be attributed to common risk factors. We adopt
the standard approach of Fama and French (1993) and estimate a regression model of the form
RLt −RSt = α+ β(RMt −RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + εt, (3)
where RLt−RSt is the return difference of the respective hedge strategy, i.e., the long leg minus
the short leg. For each country we compute country-specific factors as follows. A country’s
broad market index represents its market return RMt, while the size and value factor, RSMBt
and RHMLt, are computed according to the methodology of Fama and French (1993). Given
the factor structure in (3), we can identify the alpha generated by the hedge strategy net of
common risk factors.
Table 4 displays the results of a Fama-French regression for price momentum according to
equation (3) that uses 255 monthly returns spanning the period from January 1988 to March
2009. Across all countries, the risk factors explain most of the variation of the loser and win-
ner quintiles’ excess returns, thus confirming our descriptive analysis in the previous section.
However, concerning the long-short strategies, we note that the model’s explanatory power is
generally low, confirming prior evidence as in Fama and French (1996). The resulting alphas are
positive and significant at the 5%-level for 16 out of 17 countries, with Ireland being the odd one
out. Note that the hedge strategies are also promising in terms of economical significance since
they generate monthly alphas in excess of 67 basis points, the Norwegian alpha even amounts to
136 basis points, followed by 127 basis points for Italy and for Greece. Across countries, we note
that the alphas are mostly driven equally by the long and the short leg, with a slight tendency
towards the short leg. However, the U.S. alpha of 83 basis points is almost entirely due to the
short leg.
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Table 5 gives the analogous results of the Fama-French regression for earnings momentum
which is not captured by common risk factors as well. All countries exhibit positive alphas that
are significant on a 5%-level in 16 cases—the exception to the rule are Greece and Italy. Hence,
this analysis significantly hardens our pure return diagnostics. As for the sources to the earnings
momentum alphas, there is also a tendency towards the short leg.
4. Momentum Strategies and Data Snooping
From the previous section we learn that 15 out of 17 countries exhibit positive and significant
price momentum alphas and 16 exhibit positive and significant earnings momentum alphas.
However, these alphas may be spurious, since they arise from single hypothesis tests performed
for each country. Therefore, we will subject both momentum strategies to recent econometric
methods that additionally account for multiple testing. These testing procedures either control
the familywise error rate (FWE) or the false discovery proportion (FDP). Below, we will briefly
introduce the concept behind these methods.4
4.1. Accounting for Multiple Testing
When simultaneously testing several, say S, trading strategies against a common benchmark,
some strategies may outperform others by chance alone. For instance, extensive re-use of a given
database or testing one investment idea on various markets of similar nature are prime examples.
The latter case applies to our setting, since we wish to detect anomalies in several equity markets
simultaneously. Our tests in the previous section suggest a momentum anomaly for a specific
country, if the respective alpha is statistically proven positive “beyond any reasonable doubt”.
Hence, there is a small chance that a wrongly identified anomaly passes the test. However, this
logic assumes that only one country is tested. If many countries are tested at the same time, it
may become more likely that some countries’ momentum will be wrongly identified as anomalies.
Therefore, we must carefully combine the individual hypotheses into multiple testing procedures
that control for the possibility of data snooping biases.
4For an overview, see Lehmann and Romano (2005, Chapter 9).
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4.1.1. Methods Based on the FWE
The traditional way to account for multiple testing is to control the familywise error rate, defined
as the probability of rejecting at least one of the true null hypotheses. If this objective is achieved,
one can be confident that all hypotheses that have been rejected are indeed false (instead of
some true ones having been rejected by chance alone). There are many methods that control
the FWE, the simplest one being the well-known Bonferroni (1936) method, which consists
of a plain p-value adjustment, i.e., the initial significance level α is divided by the number of
hypotheses under test. Evidently, this method is strict and would result in an outright rejection
of any momentum anomaly in all countries. However, it is also important to use a method that
provides as much power as possible so that false hypotheses have a chance of being detected.
Romano and Wolf (2005) note that the conservativeness of classical procedures like the one of
Bonferroni (1936) is due to the fact that these methods assume a worst-case dependence structure
of the test statistics. For instance, if we consider the extreme case of all hedge strategies yielding
the very same alpha, then individual tests should be carried out at the level α, which obviously
is more powerful than the Bonferroni (1936) method. Hence, accounting for the true dependence
structure is important. In our set-up, we would like to detect as many countries as possible in
which the momentum anomaly actually exists. In this respect, the recent proposal of Romano
andWolf (2005) appears to be the state of the art. On the one hand, it improves upon Bonferroni-
type methods based on the individual p-values by incorporating the dependence structure across
test statistics. On the other hand, it improves upon the bootstrap reality check of White (2000)
by incorporating a stepwise approach and by employing studentized test statistics. We briefly
describe this k-StepM method in Appendix A, which ultimately returns a confidence region for
the return or the alpha.
4.1.2. Method Based on the False Discovery Proportion (FDP)
When the number of hypotheses under test is very large, the error control may be based on the
false discovery proportion rather than on the familywise error rate. Let F be the number of false
rejections arising from a multiple testing method and let R be the total number of rejections.
We define the FDP as the fraction F/R, given that R > 0. Otherwise, the FDP is zero. A
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multiple testing method controls the FDP at level α if P (FDP > γ) ≤ α, for any P , at least
asymptotically. Typical values of γ are 0.05 and 0.1.
Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2008) present a generalized version of the StepM method that
allows for controlling the FDP, the FDP-StepMγ method. The method is somewhat complex
and the reader is referred to the paper for the details. However, the first step of the method
is easy to understand and works as follows. Consider controlling the FDP with γ = 0.1. The
method starts with applying the StepM method. If less than nine hypotheses are rejected, the
method stops. If nine or more hypotheses are rejected, the method continues and some further
hypotheses might be rejected subsequently.
Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2008) compare the k-StepM methods to competing methods
by means of a simulation study and two empirical applications. They find that all of the
methods provide control of the respective error rates. However, the FWE control is too strict,
but generalized error rates such as the k-FWE or the FDP allow for more power. Also, the
StepM methods turn out to be more powerful than those methods that do not account for
the dependence structure of test statistics. Therefore, the methods related to StepM are most
suitable for our purpose.
4.2. Is Momentum Due to Data Snooping?
Reconciling the results of the traditional analysis, we are left with 17 positive and significant
price momentum alphas and 16 positive and significant earnings momentum alphas. Since this
result could have occurred by chance alone, we need to account for multiple testing issues using
the methods presented above.
To control the FWE, we consider the k-StepM method for k = 1 which is the appropriate
choice given the number of strategies under study. To control the FDP, we pursue the FDP-
StepMγ using γ = 0.1. We keep the significance level constant at 5% across all multiple testing
procedures and we present results for the return of the hedge strategies as well as their alphas
arising from the Fama-French time series regressions. To account for potential serial correlation
in the return series, we use a kernel variance estimator based on the Parzen kernel to studentize
the test statistics, see Andrews (1991). The bootstrap method is the stationary bootstrap with
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an average block size of 12 months.5
Panel A of Table 6 reports the countries’ return statistics for price momentum. We provide
the lower confidence band cl for the returns using studentized test statistics according to the
StepM and FDP-StepMγ method, respectively. Since we are in a one-sided test setting, we give
the lower limits of the confidence interval as computed in the last step of the respective method.
The value in the column labeled rej equals 1 if 0 /∈ [cl,∞), which indicates the rejection of
capital market efficiency and suggests the presence of an anomaly in the respective country.
Concerning the results for the price momentum returns, we observe 14 rejections by the
StepM method. Thus, the FDP-StepMγ is not equivalent to the StepM, since the number of
rejections exceeds nine. Moreover, the FDP-StepMγ rejects market efficiency for all countries.
Panel B of Table 6 displays the multiple testing results using the Fama-French price momen-
tum alphas as test statistics. With this metric, price momentum is found to be overwhelmingly
robust to data snooping. Already the StepM method yields 18 rejections of capital market
efficiency, hence, this result is echoed by the FDP-StepMγ .
As for the earnings momentum strategies, Table 6 reveals results that are qualitatively similar
to the ones obtained for price momentum. However, considering returns as test statistic, the
StepM gives only ten rejections of capital market efficiency as does the FDP-StepMγ method.
Considering alphas as test statistic, the StepM method detects 15 and the FDP-StepMγ method
17 significant alphas.
In closing this section, we conclude that the detected price and earnings momentum anoma-
lies are confirmed by our battery of tests that account for multiple testing issues. By and large,
both phenomena prove to be quite persistent and raise the need of sound economic inference.
5. Linking Price and Earnings Momentum
Having ruled out data snooping biases as possible explanations to the momentum effects, we will
further delve into the economic nature of these phenomena. In fact, one may wonder whether
both price and earnings momentum may be traced back to similar sources, be it a behavioral bias
5Using the stationary bootstrap with an average block size of six months leaves results virtually unchanged.
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or a compensation for risk. When inspecting the cumulative returns in Figure 1, we have already
noted that price and earnings momentum do follow very similar return paths. To quantify this
similarity, one may simply compute the correlation of selected price and earnings momentum
portfolios. In untabulated results we document that portfolios with identical price and earnings
momentum ranking unsurprisingly exhibit correlation figures ranging from 0.8 to 0.95. Moreover,
this relation also holds in the remaining countries with the same order of magnitude.6
Given these results, we suspect the price and earnings momentum hedge strategies to be
positively correlated as well. Indeed, while Greece unsurprisingly exhibits rather zero correla-
tion, all of the remaining time series of returns exhibit significantly positive correlation with
correlation coefficients between 0.262 and 0.632. Among the 17 countries, we find 15 (nine) with
correlation in excess of 0.3 (0.4). We also compute the correlation of price and earnings momen-
tum alphas using the respective time-series arising from the trailing Fama-French regressions
of Section 3. While the Danish alphas’ correlation is not distinguishable from zero the general
pattern of alpha correlations is consistent with the return correlations, giving 15 significant fig-
ures ranging from 0.138 (Sweden) to 0.749 (Germany). Among the 17 countries we find 13 (11)
with correlations inexcess of 0.3 (0.4). Hence, the unsystematic component of price and earnings
momentum returns is highly correlated as well.
5.1. Does Earnings Momentum Subsume Price Momentum?
So far we have compiled considerable evidence that price and earnings momentum are closely
connected in the U.S. and several European markets. In fact, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006)
show that the U.S. price momentum alpha vanishes when additionally controlling for earnings
momentum, while the U.S. earnings momentum alpha is robust when vice versa controlling for
price momentum. Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) thus reason that price momentum is just a
noisy proxy for earnings momentum. While this reasoning is quite persuasive, we wonder whether
this observation carries over to other markets. Therefore, when testing for price momentum, we
extend the Fama-French setting of Equation (3) to a four-factor model by adding an earnings
6These results are available upon request.
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momentum factor:
RLt −RSt = α+ β(RMt −RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + ζRPMNt + εt, (4)
where RPMNt refers to the returns of the earnings momentum strategy (positive minus negative
earnings revisions). Accordingly, Table 7 contrasts the Fama-French results to those of the
above four-factor model for all countries’ respective hedge strategies. For the U.S. and the
aggregate European strategy, we additionally give the results for the quintile portfolios. While
the returns of the quintile portfolios are usually reasonably captured by the Fama-French factors,
the returns of the price momentum strategies are not. Even though these strategies sometimes
have loadings to one common factor or another, the adjusted R2s are typically quite low with
the U.S. exhibiting the largest R2 of 19.7%.
Considering the alphas of quintile portfolios, we note a monotonic increase from loser to
winner portfolios. For instance, the monthly U.S. price momentum alpha of 83 basis points
results from -77 basis points for the loser quintile and to +5 basis points from the winner quintile.
However, this huge spread is almost eroded when controlling for the earnings momentum factor.
The loser quintile’s alpha is -47 basis points and the winner quintile’s alpha reduces to -18 basis
points. As a consequence, the U.S. price momentum ceases to be significant under the four-factor
model, consistent with the results of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006).
The general pattern in Europe is similar. For instance, for the European strategy we observe
the following. While the Fama-French model attains an adjusted R2 of 12.5%, the four-factor
model explains 40.3% of the variation in European price momentum returns, cutting down the
Fama-French alpha of 123 basis points to insignificant 24 basis points. Across all countries,
the addition of the earnings momentum strategy in (4) seems reasonable, since all portfolios
except for Italy exhibit significant loadings to this factor. In particular, the adjusted R2 of the
hedge strategies usually increases by a considerable amount. In this sense, all countries’ price
momentum alphas are clearly reduced in the four-factor model and so are the corresponding
t-statistics. The latter reductions imply statistical insignificance in six out of 16 European
countries. The price momentum alphas of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, and
Sweden are subsumed by the respective earnings momentum factor.
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According to Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), for earnings momentum to be the crucial
driver of price momentum, the former should be robust when controlling for the latter. Hence,
we determine the earnings momentum alphas arising from the following four-factor model
RLt −RSt = α+ β(RMt −RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + ηRWMLt + εt, (5)
where the original Fama-French model is augmented by the return of the price momentum
strategy, RWMLt (winner minus loser). In Table 8 we contrast the Fama-French results to
those of the above four-factor model for all countries’ respective hedge strategies. As before,
results for the quintile portfolios according to the U.S. and the European aggregate strategy
are also depicted. Again, we note that the additional factor leads to a considerable increase
in statistical fit. In fact, the adjusted R2 of the Fama-French model and the four-factor model
almost resemble the figures obtained in the price momentum case. Consistent with Chordia and
Shivakumar (2006), the U.S. earnings momentum alpha remains large at 44 basis points with
a highly significant t-statistic of 3.73. Given that the European earnings momentum alpha has
a t-statistic of 6.15, we suspect that this observation carries over to other countries. Indeed,
10 of 14 original European anomalies remain significant after controlling for price momentum.
Only Austria, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland do cease to have significant earnings momentum
alphas.
To summarize, among 17 countries we initially find 16 countries exhibiting significant price
momentum alphas in a classical Fama-French setting—Greece exhibits neither price nor earnings
momentum. Further excluding Ireland who does not exhibit price momentum we are left with
14 countries of which five follow the explanation offered by Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), i.e.,
earnings momentum subsumes price momentum. These countries include the U.S., Finland, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. Among the eight remaining four-factor price momentum
anomalies, five countries also have four-factor earnings momentum anomalies (Denmark, France,
Germany, and the U.K.). Two countries’ earnings momentum alphas cease to be significant
(Austria and Norway) and Spain and Switzerland have no significant four-factor alphas at all.
In summary, we obtain an aggregate European pattern that suggests a translation of Chordia
and Shivakumar (2006)’s argument to European equity markets which is less accentuated on a
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country-level.
To uncover whether this reasoning may be confined to special circumstances, we investigate
the time series of price momentum alphas arising from a trailing Fama-French regressions ac-
cording to equation (3). We use a 36-month window and plot the resulting alphas in the upper
graphs of Figure 2 for earnings momentum and in the lower graphs of Figure 2 for price momen-
tum. Merely focussing on Fama-French alphas (dashed lines) both momentum strategies’ alphas
prove to be consistently positive throughout the sample period. However, while the evolution
of price momentum alphas is rather volatile, earnings momentum alphas behave more steadily.
Interestingly, the momentum strategies have experienced severe drawdowns at the end of the
nineties which they seem to have recovered from within a quite short time span. However, while
the European strategies keep up their level the U.S. strategies’ alphas seem to have faded away.
First, we consider earnings momentum and contrast the respective Fama-French alpha (dashed
line) and the four-factor alpha (solid line) in the upper graphs of Figure 2. While the four-factor
earnings momentum alphas are slightly reduced as compared to figures arising from the Fama-
French setting, we observe that earnings momentum is still very prominent in both regions,
however, the European strategy is less volatile than the U.S. one. Turning to price momentum
we see that the large U.S. Fama-French alpha is substantially reduced when additionally con-
trolling for earnings momentum. However, by the end of 1999, which coincides with the end
of the sample period in Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), this relation breaks down for some
years. Obviously, price and earnings momentum have decoupled following the burst of the tech
bubble. This reasoning supports the general view that earnings momentum typically will be a
result of investors’ underreaction to fundamental news, while the market frenzy at the end of
the nineties is more likely the result from overreaction. In addition, our finding suggests that
U.S. investors will most likely have put less weight on earnings information following several
accounting scandals at the beginning of the century. On the other hand, the European Fama-
French price momentum alpha is literally neutralized by the earnings momentum factor for the
whole sample period. On the other hand Hence, while earnings momentum is a crucial driver of
price momentum, there seem to be other forces at work, too.
[Fig. 2 about here.]
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6. Origins of Momentum: Risk or Behavioral Bias?
The results of the previous section essentially suggest that any momentum rationale will be
closely linked to the drivers of earnings momentum and is rather due to a behavioral bias. In
further rationalizing the momentum anomaly, we will analyze the interaction of momentum
with measures of information uncertainty and we will investigate the role of liquidity risk in
momentum profits.
6.1. Momentum and Information Uncertainty
The theoretical model of Hong and Stein (1999) posits that firm-specific information only gradu-
ally spreads across investors resulting in underreaction and, as a consequence, short-term return
continuation. If momentum is due to investors’ underreaction to fundamental news, the respec-
tive price drift should be higher in more opaque information environments for which information
diffusion is slowest. In fact, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) find empirical support for their theory
by demonstrating that U.S. momentum strategies are more effective in companies of small size
or in companies with low analyst coverage. Besides these two metrics, Zhang (2006) recently
provides evidence that the U.S. price momentum strategy is also more effective when limited to
high uncertainty stocks as measured by firm age, dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts, stock
volatility, and cash flow volatility. Especially, the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts has
been used in prior studies to proxy for differences in opinion, see Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina
(2002). For instance, this heterogeneity in beliefs is a necessary condition for price drift in the
model of Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009), a link that is empirically corroborated for the
U.S. by Verardo (2009).
Of course, establishing a link between international momentum and information uncertainty
would further substantiate the momentum rationale of investors underreacting to fundamen-
tal news. Hence, we will examine price and earnings momentum profits for different degrees
of information uncertainty. We consider four measures to proxy for information uncertainty:
Analyst coverage, size, total stock volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility. Idiosyncratic volatility
arises from a standard Fama-French regression and total stock volatility is estimated using stock
returns. For both volatilities, we use return data over the last three years.
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Table 9 gives the results for the price momentum strategy in the upper panel A. In partic-
ular, we first sort stocks into five quintiles based on past returns. For each quintile the stocks
are further sorted into three terciles based on one of the four information uncertainty proxies.
Obviously, this procedure requires a sufficient number of companies in a given country to deliver
meaningful results. Therefore, we exclude the seven smallest countries from the analysis, i.e.,
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, and Portugal.
Our findings are as follows. First, we find U.S. price momentum to be indeed more pro-
nounced for stocks with low analyst coverage or smaller size. However, across volatility terciles,
be it total or idiosyncratic volatility, the price momentum returns are more uniform. Second,
these findings do not only translate to the aggregate European momentum strategy, but also to
most of the European country strategies. In fact, only Denmark does refute the underreaction
rationale. Third, while the earnings momentum results are quite similar among the major equity
markets, we note that the results for some smaller countries are somewhat muted.
Thus, having gathered substantial support for the underreaction theory, one may wonder as
to why the momentum anomaly is not arbitraged away. Recent research for the U.S. contends
that high arbitrage costs prevent rational investors from exploiting the momentum anomaly.7
Presumably, the cost of short-selling small stocks is not offset by the expected momentum profits.
The fact that we often find momentum to be most pronounced in stocks with high idiosyncratic
volatility, which is a common proxy for arbitrage costs, constitutes persuasive explanation for
the persistence of the momentum effect.
6.2. Momentum and Liquidity
In further elaborating on the above argument, we next examine the role of liquidity when im-
plementing momentum strategies. Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) and Korajczyk and Sadka
(2004) evidence that exploiting U.S. price momentum is costly. In fact, trading costs appear
to erode all of the potential profits rendering the momentum arbitrage opportunity an illusion.
The trading costs basically derive from frequent trading in mostly illiquid stocks. Consequently,
Sadka (2006) documents a close relation between liquidity risk and U.S. momentum strategies.
7See Arena, Haggard, and Yan (2008) for price momentum and Mendenhall (2004) for the post-earnings
announcement drift.
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Moreover, Liu (2006)’s liquidity-augmented two-factor asset pricing model almost completely
subsumes the U.S. price momentum alpha. Hence, we expect liquidity to also play a crucial role
in inhibiting profitable execution of the European momentum strategies.
To operationalize this conjecture, we analyze the profitability of the momentum strategies
when restricting to winner and loser stocks characterized by different degrees of liquidity. Liu
(2006) aptly describes liquidity “as the ability to trade large quantities quickly at low cost with
little price impact.” To account for the according distinct dimensions of liquidity, we compute
different liquidity metrics. A stock’s dollar volume or its turnover allow to capture the trading
quantity dimension. As for the price impact dimension, we resort to the ILLIQ measure of
Amihud (2002), which is the absolute daily return divided by the associated dollar volume. To
obtain an aggregate monthly value of ILLIQ, we simply compute its mean over the corresponding
daily values. The fourth measure is the one introduced by Liu (2006), which has been designed
to capture multiple dimensions of liquidity such as trading speed and trading quantity. Its
definition is as follows:
Liu Measure = Number of No-Trading Days over the prior 12 months+
1/Turnover
1, 000, 000
, (6)
where turnover is the average daily turnover over the prior 12 months. This measure addresses
the trading speed dimension of liquidity, since it very well captures lock-in-risk, i.e., the danger
of being locked in a certain position that cannot be sold.8
Table 10 displays the profitability of momentum strategies restricted to winner and loser
stocks characterized by different degrees of liquidity. In particular, we first sort stocks into five
quintiles based on past returns or earnings revisions. For each quintile the stocks are further
sorted into three terciles based on one of the four liquidity measures. Again, we exclude the
seven smallest countries from the analysis, i.e., Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Norway, and Portugal. Panel A of Table 10 gives the results for the price momentum strategy.
Across most countries and liquidity metrics, the general pattern is that the least momentum
profits occur for the most liquid stocks and that profitability is increasing with illiquidity. For
instance, U.S. price momentum for stocks with the highest dollar volume is only significant at
8Note that while the first three measures only take into account the stock’s liquidity over the precedent month,
the Liu measure hinges on data of the preceding year.
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the 10%-level.
However, this pattern of momentum profitability decreasing with liquidity is less pronounced
for the aggregate European strategy. In addition, the according hedge returns still amount to at
least 96 basis points per month with t-statistics well above four, which suggests that momentum
may be less costly to implement in Europe than in the U.S.. Our finding on the European
aggregate seems to be driven by the U.K., Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, in which price
momentum is rather strong among more liquid securities. On the other hand, the Netherlands
do not exhibit sustainable momentum in the most liquid securities. However, Spain and Denmark
even reverse the expected outcome by exhibiting no price momentum in the least liquid securities
and Sweden is hardly showing any evidence of price momentum at all.
Interestingly, when using the share turnover as liquidity metric, the relation between liquidity
and momentum profitability is sometimes reversed. For instance, judging liquidity by share
turnover, both the U.S. and European aggregate price momentum strategy are most profitable
in the most liquid securities. This puzzling result is in line with Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2006),
who argue that trading volume as measured by turnover is a proxy for investor attention. When
price momentum is mainly an overreaction-driven phenomenon, it should be relatively stronger
among high turnover stocks. Vice versa, earnings momentum that is likely to be more related to
underreaction should be relatively stronger among low turnover stocks, since investor attention
is presumably lower.
The evidence in Panel B of Table 10 does recover such an argument for U.S. momentum
strategies to some extent. While U.S. price momentum is profitable among high turnover stocks,
earnings momentum is only generating an insignificant return of 16 basis points among high
turnover stocks, corroborating the rationale of Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2006). However, for
European stocks, we cannot draw the same conclusion. In many countries countries and the
European aggregate, the high turnover stocks generate significant returns often larger than those
for low turnover stocks. Nevertheless, given the temporary decoupling of price and earnings mo-
mentum after the burst of the tech bubble reported in Figure 2, such a result has been expected.
Therefore, we conclude that there are times at which overreaction may play a significant role
in driving a wedge between price and earnings momentum strategies. As for the U.S. earnings
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momentum strategy, we further find that the liquidity effect is most pronounced for the ILLIQ
measure in Panel B of Table 10. We obtain an insignificant monthly return spread of 25 basis
points. Hence, we complement the findings of Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka, and Shivakumar
(2009), who show the post-earnings announcement drift to be equally useless among illiquid
stocks as measured by ILLIQ. Interestingly, our findings on earnings momentum profits for the
aggregate Europe sample are quite different. Across all liquidity measures, the strategy earns
at least 65 basis points with t-statistics between four and eight. However, the country-level
results are more in line with the persuasive U.S. story. For example, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Spain, and Sweden exhibit considerably less earnings momentum for highly liquid stocks. Fi-
nally, the overall grouping of the different country strategies into the different terciles (last two
rows of Panel A and Panel B) suggests that liquidity appears to be a more severe impediment
to implementing price momentum strategies as opposed to earnings momentum strategies.
7. Conclusion
The investigation of a given security mispricing typically addresses two questions. Is the anomaly
simply a compensation for risk or is the anomaly real and, if yes, what behavioral bias is driving
it? Of course, these questions are only meaningful if the security mispricing is not spurious in the
first place. Hence, one needs to safeguard against data snooping biases. We find that both price
and earnings momentum are robust with respect to multiple testing issues, reinforcing the grow-
ing body of research documenting magnitude and persistence of both anomalies. Researchers
have long been speculating about a link between price and earnings momentum. Inspired by the
work of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), we find that European price momentum most likely
is subsumed by earnings momentum. However, there are some European countries that do not
support such a conclusion. As for the U.S., we especially observe some decoupling of price and
earnings momentum following the burst of the tech bubble. In any case, our findings suggest
that the price momentum rationale will most likely be related to earnings momentum and we
thus narrow the search in favor of a behavioral-based explanation. In particular, winner and
loser portfolios characterized by high information uncertainty give rise to even larger momen-
tum profits. Thus, given that price momentum largely is earnings momentum in disguise, our
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evidence supports the rationale of momentum being driven by investors’ underreaction to fun-
damental news. Moreover, we attribute the persistence of the momentum anomaly to the fact
that significant arbitrage costs prevent investors from its exploitation. We find liquidity to be a
crucial driver in governing the momentum effects. However, while the U.S. momentum effects
clearly are most pronounced among illiquid winner and loser stocks, there are some European
markets that exhibit very profitable momentum strategies even for highly liquid stocks.
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Appendix A: Multiple Testing based on the StepM Method
We describe the k-StepM that allows for controlling the k-FWE. Consider S individual decision
problems of the form
Hs : θs ≤ 0 versus H
′
s : θs > 0, 1 ≤ s ≤ S, (7)
each referring to the hedge strategy in country s. We define the parameter θs in such a way that
under the null hypothesis Hs, strategy s does not beat the zero benchmark. Given the time series
of the hedge strategies, we can compute the test statistic wT,s with an estimate of its standard
deviation σT,s based on the returns and the strategies’ alphas according to the Fama-French
momentum regressions. In particular, using monthly hedge returns xt,s, we compute average
monthly buy-and-hold returns as in Section 3. Thus, we have
wT,s = x¯T,s =
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt,s, (8)
which we studentize by σT,s that we estimate using the Parzen kernel. Likewise, the test statistic
for the alpha is the intercept from estimating equation (3)
wT,s = αˆT,s, (9)
studentized by the estimated standard deviation of αˆT,s.
Within the k-StepM method, we first re-label strategies such that r1 corresponds to the
largest test statistic and rS to the smallest one. Then, we need to determine a confidence region
of the form
[wT,r1 − σT,r1d1,∞)× · · · × [wT,rS − σT,rSd1,∞). (10)
Whenever 0 /∈ [wT,rs −σT,rsd1,∞), we reject Hs for s = 1, ..., S. To control the FWE, d1 ideally
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is given by the (1−α)-quantile of the distribution of the largest ‘centered’ studentized9 statistic
wT,s − θs
σT,s
among all true hypotheses. However, we do not know which hypotheses are true and we do not
know the true probability mechanism P . Therefore, we take the largest difference among all
hypotheses and we replace P by a bootstrap estimate Pˆ , which implies that the StepM method
will only allow for asymptotic control of the FWE. This feature is shared by all other commonly
used multiple testing procedures.
If we suppose that we have rejected R1 < k hypotheses, we can construct a new confidence
region to reexamine the remaining (S −R1) smallest test statistics
[wT,R1+1 − σT,R1+1d2,∞)× · · · × [wT,rS − σT,rSd2,∞), (11)
which is a smaller confidence region, because it typically holds that d1 > d2 > · · · > dS . Hence,
we can reject more false hypotheses. Therefore, such a stepwise procedure is more powerful than
the single-step method. For the computation of d2, we again lack both P and the set of true
hypotheses. For P , we use the bootstrap estimate Pˆ . However, we now only maximize over the
set of hypotheses that have not been rejected yet. Since this is a smaller set, S − R1 versus
S elements, d2 will typically be smaller than d1 (and at most equally large). If no additional
rejection occurs, we stop. Otherwise, we proceed in the same fashion until there are no further
rejections.
9Studentization requires that the average return be divided by its standard error. To obtain valid confidence
intervals for the expected return, we must multiply these quantiles with the country’s return standard error.
Romano and Wolf (2005) advocate the use of studentization, since it is more powerful and gives more appropriate
coverage probabilities for individual θrs , especially when test statistics show different standard deviations. Clearly,
the latter applies to our case.
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Table 1
Country Overview
The table contains descriptive information on the companies that have been domestically traded in the sample period (1988-2009). For further reference we may
use abbreviated country codes (Abbr.). The screening of country lists depicts the evolution of the countries’ samples. First, we give the Total size of the country
lists followed by the number of companies surviving the first screen for Major listings. The column headed Region contains the number of companies surviving the
screen eliminating regional listings and the like. The Final screen excludes companies which exhibit free-floating market value below 10 million USD. We further
describe this final sample giving the number of a country’s dead companies (#Dead) and the number of companies with at least one I/B/E/S estimate in the sample
period (#I/B/E/S), along with respective percentage values (%-Dead and %-I/B/E/S). The last column gives the starting month of the strategy. The table provides
information for the U.S. in Panel A, while Panel B covers European countries.
Country Abbr. Screening of Country Lists Final Sample: FMV> 10 Start
Total Major F inal FMV> 10 #Dead %Dead #Return %Return #I/B/E/S %I/B/E/S Date
Panel A: USA
USA USA 36659 20030 7279 6272 2554 40.7% 6180 98.5% 4860 77.5% Jan 88
Panel B: Europe
Europe 29266 10522 9383 7019 1996 28.4% 6901 98.3% 5169 73.6% Jan 88
Austria A 360 177 161 119 31 26.1% 115 96.6% 80 67.2% Jan 88
Belgium BEL 1000 288 263 206 40 19.4% 200 97.1% 129 62.6% Jan 88
Denmark DK 685 365 230 197 55 27.9% 197 100 % 167 84.8% Jan 88
Finland FN 341 190 180 159 42 26.4% 155 97.5% 138 86.8% Aug 90
France FR 2643 1458 1368 945 258 27.3% 917 97.0% 631 66.8% Jan 88
Germany GER 10740 1833 1525 1017 228 22.4% 991 97.4% 646 63.5% Jan 88
Greece GR 523 393 360 338 57 16.9% 338 100 % 234 69.2% Mar 95
Ireland IRL 187 98 94 85 26 30.6% 83 97.6% 63 74.1% Nov 93
Italy IL 794 390 365 345 95 27.5% 345 100 % 305 88.4% Jan 88
Netherlands NL 791 272 250 201 77 38.3% 199 99.0% 182 90.5% Jan 88
Norway NOR 585 328 284 254 98 38.6% 252 99.2% 219 86.2% Jan 88
Portugal POR 296 146 134 92 48 52.2% 91 98.9% 66 71.7% Jul 93
Spain ES 311 204 180 170 51 30.0% 168 98.8% 160 94.1% Jan 88
Sweden SWE 1203 549 441 346 109 31.5% 344 99.4% 280 80.9% Jan 88
Switzerland CH 1130 387 316 277 49 17.7% 274 98.9% 217 78.3% Jan 88
United Kingdom UK 7677 3444 3232 2268 732 32.3% 2232 98.4% 1652 72.8% Jan 88
All 65738 30454 16568 13206 4524 34.3% 12998 98.4% 9966 75.5%
Top 5 58922 27314 13845 10848 3881 35.8% 10664 98.3% 8094 74.6%
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Momentum Quintile Portfolios 1/2
The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns and volatility of quintile portfolios that are built monthly dependent on the price momentum ranking (left
panel) or dependent on the earnings momentum ranking (right panel). All figures refer to the period from January 1988 to March 2009. We give the return differential
of the respective hedge strategies along with the according t-statistic in parentheses. The table also gives the two risk proxies beta and size. Both are gathered using
data of the whole period, in particular beta arises from a standard CAPM regression and size is measured as the average of log(marketvalue). Note that we do not
compute the size proxy for the hedge strategies but give the t-statistic belonging to the return differential.
Price Momentum Ranking Hedge Strategies Earnings Momentum Ranking
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Price Earnings Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Country
Return 0.70 0.90 1.02 1.12 1.43 0.72 0.46 0.92 0.85 0.80 1.08 1.38 Return
Volatility 7.01 5.12 4.52 4.56 6.19 3.91 2.39 6.60 5.34 4.64 4.85 5.66 Volatility
USA
Beta 1.22 0.88 0.76 0.78 1.05 -0.16 -0.11 1.18 0.94 0.79 0.83 1.00 Beta
USA
Size 19.81 20.33 20.50 20.54 20.27 (2.99) (3.12) 19.51 20.20 20.64 20.66 20.09 Size
Return 0.31 0.64 0.88 1.05 1.41 1.11 0.76 0.52 0.62 0.73 0.87 1.28 Return
Volatility 5.74 4.45 4.07 4.09 4.77 3.24 1.65 5.26 4.64 4.18 4.15 4.49 Volatility
Europe
Beta 1.27 0.99 0.91 0.91 1.04 -0.23 -0.13 1.20 1.06 0.94 0.93 1.02 Beta
Europe
Size 20.38 20.94 21.17 21.29 21.16 (5.51) (7.42) 20.00 21.05 21.44 21.46 20.67 Size
Return 0.61 0.72 0.72 1.01 1.24 0.63 0.40 0.72 0.86 0.67 0.74 1.12 Return
Volatility 6.79 5.98 5.89 6.22 6.22 5.10 4.50 7.24 6.15 5.80 5.45 6.06 Volatility
Austria
Beta 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.20 1.18 0.00 -0.07 1.40 1.19 1.13 1.03 1.13 Beta
UK
Size 19.08 19.48 19.67 19.81 19.78 (2.00) (1.44) 19.16 19.54 19.72 19.71 19.66 Size
Return 0.37 0.51 0.76 1.07 1.31 0.94 0.70 0.56 0.65 0.66 0.95 1.26 Return
Volatility 5.62 4.80 4.55 4.63 4.97 3.72 2.95 5.60 4.99 4.38 4.73 4.93 Volatility
Belgium
Beta 1.32 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.16 -0.16 -0.05 1.33 1.22 1.09 1.11 1.19 Beta
Ireland
Size 19.60 20.04 20.11 20.21 20.07 (4.10) (3.83) 19.31 20.08 20.30 20.31 19.79 Size
Return 0.51 0.60 0.67 1.21 1.46 0.95 1.15 0.38 0.51 0.75 0.92 1.53 Return
Volatility 6.64 5.00 4.68 5.10 5.33 4.24 4.25 5.71 5.30 4.95 4.59 5.63 Volatility
Denmark
Beta 1.35 1.11 1.04 0.99 1.11 -0.24 -0.01 1.23 1.17 1.06 0.97 1.14 Beta
Germany
Size 20.74 21.10 21.20 21.24 21.35 (3.63) (4.38) 20.51 21.09 21.29 21.40 21.01 Size
Return 0.65 1.10 1.39 1.27 1.46 0.81 0.85 0.72 0.68 0.75 0.97 1.57 Return
Volatility 8.34 6.72 6.62 6.35 6.83 5.84 4.65 7.81 7.13 6.59 5.76 6.45 Volatility
Finland
Beta 1.11 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.87 -0.24 -0.10 1.06 1.00 0.91 0.80 0.86 Beta
Austria
Size 19.47 19.65 19.66 19.69 19.83 (2.23) (2.96) 19.31 19.65 19.75 19.79 19.51 Size
Return 0.58 0.82 1.05 1.16 1.53 0.96 0.68 0.68 0.79 0.86 1.04 1.36 Return
Volatility 7.16 5.62 5.20 5.11 5.72 3.89 2.74 6.72 5.89 5.26 5.22 5.55 Volatility
France
Beta 1.38 1.09 1.01 1.01 1.11 -0.27 -0.16 1.33 1.17 1.06 1.02 1.11 Beta
Switzerland
Size 19.52 20.13 20.29 20.31 20.14 (3.98) (4.01) 19.21 20.05 20.34 20.35 19.87 Size
Return 0.02 0.47 0.62 0.87 1.12 1.10 0.76 0.11 0.29 0.42 0.51 0.88 Return
Volatility 7.17 5.49 4.77 4.63 4.86 4.56 2.35 5.96 5.57 5.15 5.00 5.41 Volatility
Germany
Beta 1.44 1.14 0.97 0.94 0.98 -0.46 -0.01 1.26 1.20 1.10 1.06 1.14 Beta
France
Size 19.49 19.94 20.12 20.21 20.13 (3.91) (5.23) 19.36 20.03 20.38 20.19 19.91 Size
Return 0.70 0.92 0.99 1.58 1.92 1.22 0.23 0.98 0.54 1.13 0.86 1.21 Return
Volatility 10.22 9.75 9.28 10.04 11.28 6.43 4.34 10.64 9.33 9.93 9.61 9.62 Volatility
Greece
Beta 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.80 0.87 0.06 -0.03 0.85 0.76 0.80 0.78 0.77 Beta
Italy
Size 19.23 19.54 19.62 19.79 19.63 (3.06) (0.85) 19.26 19.49 19.61 19.68 19.36 Size
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Momentum Quintile Portfolios 2/2
The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns and volatility of quintile portfolios that are built monthly dependent on the price momentum ranking (left
panel) or dependent on the earnings momentum ranking (right panel). All figures refer to the period from January 1988 to March 2009. We give the return differential
of the respective hedge strategies along with the according t-statistic in parentheses. The table also gives the two risk proxies beta and size. Both are gathered using
data of the whole period, in particular beta arises from a standard CAPM regression and size is measured as the average of log(marketvalue). Note that we do not
compute the size proxy for the hedge strategies but give the t-statistic belonging to the return differential.
Price Momentum Ranking Hedge Strategies Earnings Momentum Ranking
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Price Earnings Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Country
Return 0.76 0.54 1.25 1.06 1.44 0.68 1.32 0.44 0.74 0.95 0.93 1.76 Return
Volatility 7.81 6.56 5.31 5.72 6.30 6.37 6.17 7.53 6.97 5.78 6.01 6.20 Volatility
Ireland
Beta 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.70 0.81 -0.16 -0.16 0.99 0.91 0.70 0.76 0.83 Beta
Greece
Size 20.07 20.35 20.39 20.25 20.11 (1.72) (3.45) 19.58 20.67 21.07 20.88 19.82 Size
Return 0.05 0.45 0.48 0.69 1.23 1.18 0.26 0.41 0.33 0.48 0.70 0.68 Return
Volatility 7.74 6.65 6.40 5.98 6.38 4.35 3.21 7.04 6.85 6.91 6.03 6.17 Volatility
Italy
Beta 1.15 1.01 0.96 0.89 0.93 -0.22 -0.14 1.06 1.05 1.02 0.88 0.94 Beta
Spain
Size 20.26 20.57 20.66 20.65 20.49 (4.38) (1.33) 19.91 20.70 20.77 20.71 20.21 Size
Return 0.67 0.94 1.06 1.12 1.38 0.71 0.82 0.64 0.77 0.85 1.10 1.46 Return
Volatility 6.42 5.08 4.80 4.65 5.59 4.10 3.47 6.30 5.18 4.79 4.84 5.35 Volatility
Netherlands
Beta 1.20 0.98 0.92 0.89 1.03 -0.17 -0.13 1.18 0.99 0.92 0.91 1.01 Beta
Portugal
Size 19.38 19.70 19.80 19.82 19.77 (2.80) (3.82) 18.93 19.80 20.21 20.02 19.42 Size
Return 0.59 0.74 1.06 0.99 1.71 1.12 0.61 0.95 0.76 0.69 1.01 1.56 Return
Volatility 8.29 6.49 6.05 6.51 7.53 5.78 5.01 7.88 6.61 6.83 6.44 6.60 Volatility
Norway
Beta 1.08 0.85 0.78 0.82 0.94 -0.14 -0.11 1.03 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.82 Beta
Netherlands
Size 21.50 21.73 21.83 21.88 21.85 (3.14) (1.98) 21.59 21.58 21.67 21.74 21.79 Size
Return 0.73 1.26 1.13 1.12 1.29 0.55 0.81 0.50 0.82 0.88 1.06 1.31 Return
Volatility 7.12 6.54 6.45 5.97 6.43 5.96 5.14 6.85 6.32 5.95 6.06 7.05 Volatility
Portugal
Beta 0.99 0.91 0.88 0.82 0.78 -0.21 0.02 0.97 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.92 Beta
Belgium
Size 19.52 19.96 20.19 20.06 19.89 (1.50) (2.55) 19.51 20.13 20.00 20.01 19.73 Size
Return 0.38 0.75 0.89 0.92 1.18 0.80 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.82 0.93 1.06 Return
Volatility 6.79 5.67 5.27 5.13 5.58 4.05 3.72 6.93 5.63 5.30 5.19 5.67 Volatility
Spain
Beta 1.10 0.93 0.87 0.83 0.88 -0.22 -0.12 1.12 0.93 0.87 0.84 0.91 Beta
Sweden
Size 19.97 20.34 20.51 20.59 20.43 (3.19) (2.37) 19.60 20.44 20.60 20.75 20.26 Size
Return 0.98 1.05 1.13 1.31 1.52 0.53 0.73 0.69 0.94 1.20 1.31 1.42 Return
Volatility 7.90 5.97 5.64 5.82 6.35 4.96 4.13 7.07 6.45 6.15 5.75 6.10 Volatility
Sweden
Beta 0.95 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.73 -0.21 -0.12 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.68 0.72 Beta
Norway
Size 21.82 22.07 22.16 22.23 22.24 (1.74) (2.87) 21.46 22.07 22.26 22.27 21.89 Size
Return 0.36 0.54 0.64 0.97 1.25 0.90 0.53 0.49 0.64 0.69 0.82 1.02 Return
Volatility 6.38 5.01 4.66 4.71 5.32 4.06 2.97 6.10 5.11 4.52 4.69 5.07 Volatility
Switzerland
Beta 1.35 1.10 1.03 1.03 1.12 -0.23 -0.14 1.32 1.13 0.99 1.02 1.10 Beta
Denmark
Size 19.90 20.24 20.37 20.50 20.41 (3.57) (2.90) 19.65 20.38 20.56 20.53 20.19 Size
Return 0.26 0.67 0.86 0.96 1.16 0.91 0.63 0.61 0.52 0.85 0.92 1.24 Return
Volatility 5.68 4.33 4.12 4.19 4.86 3.92 2.20 4.78 4.46 4.42 4.22 4.51 Volatility
UK
Beta 0.91 0.74 0.71 0.73 0.85 -0.06 -0.05 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.79 Beta
Finland
Size 24.75 24.95 24.99 24.89 24.62 (3.74) (4.65) 24.60 24.93 25.13 24.91 24.47 Size
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Table 4
Time-Series-Regressions of Price Momentum Portfolios
The table gives the results of a regression according to equation (3) using 255 monthly returns ranging from
January 1988 to March 2009 along with the according t-statistics. Portfolio 1 refers to the loser quintile, portfolio
5 refers to the winner quintile, and portfolio 5-1 is the long-short portfolio (winner-loser).
Fama-French Model
α β γ δ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) Adj.
R2
1 -0.77 1.33 -0.29 0.09 -5.21 42.87 -7.46 1.77 88.9
USA 5 0.05 1.06 -0.05 -0.29 0.33 32.38 -1.26 -5.38 84.3
5-1 0.83 -0.27 0.24 -0.38 3.70 -5.84 4.08 -4.94 19.7
1 -0.63 1.27 -0.35 0.28 -5.16 42.31 -7.92 4.62 88.6
Europe 5 0.60 1.06 -0.26 -0.03 4.90 35.50 -5.86 -0.56 83.7
5-1 1.23 -0.21 0.09 -0.32 6.43 -4.45 1.33 -3.31 12.5
1 -0.32 1.17 -0.12 0.11 -1.18 19.06 -1.90 2.09 61.5
Austria 5 0.36 1.20 -0.12 -0.02 1.73 25.50 -2.39 -0.62 72.8
5-1 0.67 0.04 0.00 -0.13 2.09 0.48 0.05 -2.14 0.6
1 -0.65 1.30 -0.02 0.09 -3.78 28.07 -0.82 2.24 76.8
Belgium 5 0.39 1.17 -0.01 -0.06 2.48 27.56 -0.39 -1.76 75.2
5-1 1.04 -0.13 0.01 -0.15 4.52 -2.09 0.35 -2.87 4.6
1 -0.50 1.34 -0.15 -0.07 -2.18 23.92 -2.24 -1.46 69.8
Denmark 5 0.52 1.11 -0.11 -0.13 3.02 26.56 -2.34 -3.91 74.2
5-1 1.02 -0.23 0.03 -0.06 3.91 -3.69 0.44 -1.27 4.9
1 -0.67 1.11 -0.02 -0.04 -2.44 24.83 -0.37 -1.41 75.6
Finland 5 0.35 0.82 -0.18 -0.06 1.43 20.88 -3.61 -2.31 71.6
5-1 1.02 -0.28 -0.16 -0.02 2.72 -4.64 -2.07 -0.47 7.6
1 -1.10 1.39 -0.19 0.21 -6.25 37.57 -3.64 4.93 85.1
France 5 0.12 1.13 -0.26 -0.06 0.85 39.49 -6.29 -1.89 86.1
5-1 1.22 -0.26 -0.06 -0.27 5.42 -5.56 -0.95 -5.02 18.1
1 -0.84 1.44 -0.25 0.02 -3.67 26.79 -4.44 0.39 74.8
Germany 5 0.43 0.97 -0.17 -0.03 2.76 26.48 -4.48 -0.67 74.5
5-1 1.26 -0.47 0.08 -0.05 4.86 -7.56 1.20 -0.74 18.3
1 -0.50 0.82 0.12 -0.19 -1.50 28.04 1.42 -1.80 81.8
Greece 5 0.77 0.89 -0.02 -0.44 1.97 25.77 -0.21 -3.58 79.3
5-1 1.27 0.07 -0.14 -0.25 2.60 1.57 -1.13 -1.64 1.8
1 -0.26 0.92 0.02 0.12 -0.70 13.86 0.32 2.34 51.2
Ireland 5 0.42 0.86 -0.01 -0.15 1.47 16.95 -0.26 -3.83 56.7
5-1 0.67 -0.06 -0.03 -0.26 1.64 -0.83 -0.47 -4.74 10.0
1 -0.71 1.16 -0.17 0.01 -3.66 36.65 -3.44 0.28 84.2
Italy 5 0.58 0.93 -0.03 -0.12 3.27 32.58 -0.70 -2.92 80.8
5-1 1.29 -0.22 0.14 -0.14 4.98 -5.26 2.11 -2.20 11.3
1 -0.29 1.13 0.04 0.17 -1.86 32.24 1.22 4.84 85.2
Netherlands 5 0.56 1.05 0.00 -0.05 3.64 30.22 0.07 -1.35 80.9
5-1 0.85 -0.08 -0.03 -0.21 3.46 -1.41 -0.73 -3.91 8.8
1 -0.95 1.09 -0.26 0.14 -3.47 25.64 -3.23 2.63 73.1
Norway 5 0.41 0.95 -0.06 -0.03 1.44 21.60 -0.71 -0.57 65.2
5-1 1.36 -0.14 0.20 -0.18 3.78 -2.53 1.91 -2.45 5.0
1 -1.10 1.00 0.20 -0.07 -2.87 13.43 1.71 -0.83 48.3
Portugal 5 -0.17 0.77 -0.01 -0.17 -0.45 10.30 -0.09 -1.84 36.4
5-1 0.93 -0.23 -0.21 -0.09 2.11 -2.69 -1.57 -0.89 3.6
1 -0.60 1.09 -0.03 -0.06 -3.63 37.40 -0.96 -1.52 85.1
Spain 5 0.29 0.88 -0.03 -0.07 1.86 32.39 -0.92 -1.91 81.1
5-1 0.89 -0.22 0.00 -0.01 3.64 -5.06 0.07 -0.17 8.4
1 -0.15 0.94 -0.26 0.06 -0.57 25.69 -4.90 1.55 73.6
Sweden 5 0.55 0.73 -0.27 0.03 2.48 23.12 -5.82 0.83 70.1
5-1 0.69 -0.22 0.00 -0.03 2.31 -5.07 -0.07 -0.72 8.3
1 -0.58 1.28 -0.06 0.12 -3.77 32.46 -1.62 2.98 85.8
Switzerland 5 0.43 1.14 0.01 -0.05 3.16 32.42 0.39 -1.34 83.8
5-1 1.01 -0.14 0.08 -0.16 4.10 -2.19 1.22 -2.59 8.4
1 -0.26 0.89 -0.15 0.23 -1.23 20.46 -3.79 2.90 64.8
UK 5 0.68 0.86 -0.08 -0.20 4.43 26.96 -2.78 -3.59 74.5
5-1 0.94 -0.04 0.07 -0.43 4.04 -0.77 1.61 -4.99 9.9
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Table 5
Time-Series-Regressions of Earnings Momentum Portfolios
The table gives the results of a regression according to equation (3) using 255 monthly returns ranging from
January 1988 to March 2009 along with the according t-statistics. Portfolio 1 refers to the negative earnings
revisions quintile, portfolio 5 refers to the positive earnings revision quintile, and portfolio 5-1 is the long-short
portfolio (positive-negative).
Fama-French Model
α β γ δ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) Adj.
R2
1 -0.59 1.23 -0.09 0.14 -5.25 52.19 -3.16 3.73 92.8
USA 5 0.07 1.09 -0.24 -0.06 0.66 48.43 -8.47 -1.76 91.1
5-1 0.66 -0.14 -0.15 -0.21 5.09 -5.16 -4.26 -4.68 26.7
1 -0.40 1.20 -0.25 0.23 -4.52 55.08 -7.76 5.14 92.8
Europe 5 0.44 1.03 -0.24 0.12 5.21 49.89 -7.93 2.88 91.3
5-1 0.84 -0.17 0.01 -0.11 9.19 -7.70 0.26 -2.35 22.1
1 -0.29 1.39 -0.11 0.10 -1.28 27.01 -2.06 2.39 76.0
Austria 5 0.25 1.11 0.06 0.04 1.18 23.19 1.17 1.06 70.3
5-1 0.53 -0.28 0.17 -0.06 1.96 -4.43 2.60 -1.16 8.8
1 -0.49 1.31 -0.02 0.10 -2.97 29.57 -0.85 2.55 78.6
Belgium 5 0.28 1.19 -0.03 0.01 2.07 32.15 -1.67 0.39 80.8
5-1 0.77 -0.12 -0.01 -0.08 4.21 -2.41 -0.49 -2.00 3.5
1 -0.56 1.23 0.02 0.01 -3.25 29.18 0.50 0.39 77.0
Denmark 5 0.59 1.14 -0.05 -0.07 2.95 23.29 -0.95 -1.82 68.3
5-1 1.16 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 4.35 -1.48 -1.04 -1.63 1.3
1 -0.37 1.04 -0.07 0.04 -1.53 26.68 -1.38 1.63 77.9
Finland 5 0.60 0.82 -0.12 0.00 2.84 23.77 -2.77 0.14 74.7
5-1 0.97 -0.22 -0.05 -0.04 3.33 -4.59 -0.88 -1.24 7.8
1 -0.91 1.34 -0.20 0.18 -6.64 46.51 -4.89 5.46 89.7
France 5 -0.01 1.12 -0.14 0.00 -0.11 47.77 -4.23 0.11 90.0
5-1 0.90 -0.22 0.06 -0.18 5.79 -6.68 1.28 -4.75 20.9
1 -0.69 1.26 -0.17 0.13 -4.27 33.30 -4.32 3.06 81.8
Germany 5 0.14 1.14 -0.21 0.03 0.98 33.53 -5.89 0.94 82.3
5-1 0.83 -0.12 -0.04 -0.09 5.73 -3.62 -1.07 -2.47 5.5
1 -0.17 0.86 0.02 -0.21 -0.50 28.32 0.27 -1.88 81.7
Greece 5 0.16 0.78 0.08 -0.31 0.52 29.10 1.00 -3.18 82.5
5-1 0.33 -0.08 0.05 -0.10 1.03 -2.65 0.66 -1.00 3.5
1 -0.60 0.96 0.02 0.06 -1.56 13.82 0.34 1.26 54.4
Ireland 5 0.78 0.84 -0.04 -0.05 2.55 15.14 -1.08 -1.24 56.9
5-1 1.38 -0.12 -0.06 -0.12 3.02 -1.42 -1.00 -1.89 2.9
1 -0.32 1.06 -0.11 0.10 -1.91 38.50 -2.52 2.46 85.5
Italy 5 -0.01 0.93 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 40.32 -0.43 2.05 86.6
5-1 0.31 -0.12 0.09 -0.03 1.58 -3.85 1.86 -0.63 5.5
1 -0.33 1.13 0.05 0.12 -2.18 33.70 1.88 3.59 85.7
Netherlands 5 0.62 1.02 0.00 -0.04 4.61 33.77 0.06 -1.24 84.1
5-1 0.95 -0.11 -0.05 -0.15 4.60 -2.43 -1.33 -3.42 10.2
1 -0.49 1.03 -0.07 0.11 -1.86 25.46 -0.87 2.13 73.0
Norway 5 0.32 0.83 -0.12 0.05 1.29 21.83 -1.63 0.95 66.0
5-1 0.80 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 2.61 -4.20 -0.56 -1.05 6.9
1 -1.12 0.98 0.19 -0.18 -3.20 14.12 1.75 -2.07 49.9
Portugal 5 -0.24 0.91 -0.10 -0.09 -0.60 11.82 -0.83 -0.96 41.3
5-1 0.89 -0.06 -0.29 0.08 2.40 -0.85 -2.55 0.95 2.1
1 -0.47 1.11 -0.04 -0.04 -2.71 36.46 -1.17 -0.95 84.5
Spain 5 0.15 0.91 -0.04 -0.01 1.00 35.55 -1.23 -0.30 83.8
5-1 0.62 -0.20 0.01 0.03 2.75 -5.19 0.11 0.54 9.1
1 -0.43 0.86 -0.22 0.13 -1.97 27.32 -4.69 3.98 75.8
Sweden 5 0.41 0.72 -0.23 0.10 2.03 25.14 -5.43 3.15 73.0
5-1 0.84 -0.14 -0.01 -0.04 3.30 -3.75 -0.24 -0.95 4.2
1 -0.43 1.31 -0.01 0.04 -3.44 40.73 -0.22 1.12 89.7
Switzerland 5 0.20 1.10 -0.02 -0.01 1.96 41.78 -0.81 -0.36 89.9
5-1 0.63 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 3.53 -4.44 -0.32 -0.99 10.0
1 0.09 0.84 -0.10 0.01 0.61 27.51 -3.46 0.16 75.5
UK 5 0.72 0.79 -0.08 0.07 5.06 27.02 -3.01 1.31 74.9
5-1 0.63 -0.05 0.02 0.06 4.55 -1.92 0.64 1.18 0.8
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Table 6
Accounting for Multiple Testing
The table gives the lower confidence band cl for the returns as obtained by the StepM method and the FDP-
StepM0.1using studentized test statistics as illustrated in Appendix 4.1. The rej-columns contain the resulting
decision where 1 indicates rejection of θs = 0 (capital market efficiency). Panel A provides results for returns as
test statistics and Panel B provides results for Fama-French alphas as test statistics.
Price Momentum Earnings Momentum
Country θs StepM FDP-StepM0.1 θs StepM FDP-StepM0.1
cl rej cl rej cl rej cl rej
Panel A: Return
USA 0.0072 0.0030 1 0.0044 1 0.0046 0.0005 1 0.0005 1
Europe 0.0111 0.0061 1 0.0077 1 0.0076 0.0042 1 0.0042 1
Austria 0.0063 -0.0007 0 0.0016 1 0.0040 -0.0047 0 -0.0047 0
Belgium 0.0094 0.0042 1 0.0059 1 0.0070 0.0020 1 0.0020 1
Denmark 0.0095 0.0034 1 0.0055 1 0.0115 0.0039 1 0.0039 1
Finland 0.0081 0.0004 1 0.0029 1 0.0085 0.0003 1 0.0003 1
France 0.0096 0.0046 1 0.0063 1 0.0068 0.0024 1 0.0024 1
Germany 0.0110 0.0053 1 0.0072 1 0.0076 0.0030 1 0.0030 1
Greece 0.0122 0.0029 1 0.0060 1 0.0023 -0.0076 0 -0.0076 0
Ireland 0.0068 -0.0023 0 0.0007 1 0.0132 -0.0013 0 -0.0013 0
Italy 0.0118 0.0064 1 0.0082 1 0.0026 -0.0025 0 -0.0025 0
Netherlands 0.0071 0.0013 1 0.0032 1 0.0082 0.0014 1 0.0014 1
Norway 0.0112 0.0035 1 0.0061 1 0.0061 -0.0022 0 -0.0022 0
Portugal 0.0055 -0.0024 0 0.0002 1 0.0081 -0.0007 0 -0.0007 0
Spain 0.0080 0.0023 1 0.0042 1 0.0055 -0.0015 0 -0.0015 0
Sweden 0.0053 -0.0020 0 0.0005 1 0.0073 0.0002 1 0.0002 1
Switzerland 0.0090 0.0022 1 0.0045 1 0.0053 -0.0004 0 -0.0004 0
UK 0.0091 0.0031 1 0.0051 1 0.0063 0.0027 1 0.0027 1
Panel B: Fama-French Alpha
USA 0.0083 0.0055 1 0.0064 1 0.0066 0.0036 1 0.0051 1
Europe 0.0123 0.0088 1 0.0099 1 0.0084 0.0059 1 0.0072 1
Austria 0.0067 0.0010 1 0.0028 1 0.0053 -0.0015 0 0.0019 1
Belgium 0.0104 0.0064 1 0.0077 1 0.0077 0.0037 1 0.0057 1
Denmark 0.0102 0.0056 1 0.0071 1 0.0116 0.0051 1 0.0083 1
Finland 0.0102 0.0044 1 0.0062 1 0.0097 0.0031 1 0.0064 1
France 0.0122 0.0088 1 0.0099 1 0.0090 0.0055 1 0.0072 1
Germany 0.0126 0.0083 1 0.0097 1 0.0083 0.0047 1 0.0065 1
Greece 0.0127 0.0058 1 0.0080 1 0.0033 -0.0045 0 -0.0006 0
Ireland 0.0067 0.0002 1 0.0023 1 0.0138 0.0022 1 0.0080 1
Italy 0.0129 0.0087 1 0.0100 1 0.0031 -0.0013 0 0.0009 1
Netherlands 0.0085 0.0045 1 0.0058 1 0.0095 0.0041 1 0.0068 1
Norway 0.0136 0.0077 1 0.0096 1 0.0080 0.0016 1 0.0048 1
Portugal 0.0093 0.0029 1 0.0049 1 0.0089 0.0014 1 0.0051 1
Spain 0.0089 0.0048 1 0.0061 1 0.0062 0.0007 1 0.0034 1
Sweden 0.0069 0.0015 1 0.0032 1 0.0084 0.0026 1 0.0055 1
Switzerland 0.0101 0.0052 1 0.0068 1 0.0063 0.0017 1 0.0040 1
UK 0.0094 0.0049 1 0.0064 1 0.0063 0.0032 1 0.0047 1
Return 14 18 10 10
Σ
Alpha 18 18 15 17
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Table 7
Time-Series-Regressions of Price Momentum Portfolios
The table’s left panel gives the results of a regression according to equation (3) using 255 monthly returns ranging from January 1988 to March 2009 followed by the
according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to equation (4). We use the country abbreviations introduced in Table 1. We give
the quintile portfolios 1 (loser) to 5 (winner) together with the long-short portfolio (winner-loser).
Fama-French Model 4-Factor Model
α β γ δ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) Adj. α β γ δ ζ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) t(ζ) Adj.
R2 R2
1 -0.77 1.33 -0.29 0.09 -5.21 42.9 -7.46 1.77 88.9 -0.47 1.27 -0.36 0.00 -0.45 -3.30 42.2 -9.58 -0.01 -6.76 90.6
2 -0.24 1.02 -0.34 0.20 -2.84 56.8 -15.1 6.92 93.1 -0.18 1.00 -0.36 0.18 -0.10 -2.00 53.8 -15.3 6.07 -2.35 93.2
3 -0.02 0.90 -0.35 0.16 -0.22 52.9 -16.0 5.88 92.0 -0.03 0.90 -0.34 0.17 0.02 -0.38 50.5 -15.3 5.79 0.54 92.0
USA
4 0.06 0.89 -0.29 0.04 0.61 46.6 -11.8 1.22 90.1 -0.03 0.91 -0.27 0.07 0.13 -0.35 46.1 -10.8 2.03 3.06 90.4
5 0.05 1.06 -0.05 -0.29 0.33 32.4 -1.26 -5.38 84.3 -0.18 1.11 0.00 -0.22 0.35 -1.16 33.7 -0.01 -4.07 4.85 85.6
5-1 0.83 -0.27 0.24 -0.38 3.70 -5.84 4.08 -4.94 19.7 0.29 -0.16 0.36 -0.22 0.80 1.40 -3.73 6.62 -3.08 8.35 37.0
1 -0.63 1.27 -0.35 0.28 -5.16 42.3 -7.92 4.62 88.6 -0.06 1.15 -0.35 0.21 -0.69 -0.47 40.1 -9.10 3.91 -9.45 91.6
2 -0.19 1.00 -0.36 0.26 -2.52 54.8 -13.4 7.10 93.0 -0.11 0.98 -0.36 0.25 -0.10 -1.24 48.7 -13.4 6.78 -1.91 93.1
3 0.09 0.92 -0.36 0.16 1.35 54.0 -14.4 4.58 92.7 -0.01 0.94 -0.36 0.17 0.12 -0.07 50.1 -14.6 4.95 2.50 92.8
EUR
4 0.28 0.94 -0.33 0.05 3.54 49.0 -11.9 1.17 91.0 0.04 0.98 -0.34 0.08 0.28 0.50 48.9 -12.6 2.03 5.47 91.9
5 0.60 1.06 -0.26 -0.03 4.90 35.5 -5.9 -0.56 83.7 0.19 1.15 -0.26 0.02 0.49 1.41 37.0 -6.4 0.35 6.29 85.9
5-1 1.23 -0.21 0.09 -0.32 6.43 -4.45 1.33 -3.31 12.5 0.24 0.00 0.08 -0.19 1.18 1.33 -0.09 1.48 -2.36 10.8 40.3
A 5-1 0.67 0.04 0.00 -0.13 2.09 0.48 0.05 -2.14 0.6 0.47 0.14 -0.06 -0.11 0.38 1.52 1.93 -0.82 -1.86 5.37 10.6
BEL 5-1 1.04 -0.13 0.01 -0.15 4.52 -2.09 0.35 -2.87 4.6 0.61 -0.06 0.02 -0.11 0.55 2.86 -1.14 0.62 -2.20 7.75 22.8
DK 5-1 1.02 -0.23 0.03 -0.06 3.91 -3.69 0.44 -1.27 4.9 0.57 -0.20 0.06 -0.03 0.40 2.28 -3.36 0.94 -0.67 6.99 20.2
FN 5-1 1.02 -0.28 -0.16 -0.02 2.72 -4.64 -2.07 -0.47 7.6 0.39 -0.14 -0.13 0.01 0.66 1.19 -2.57 -1.96 0.22 9.28 32.8
FR 5-1 1.22 -0.26 -0.06 -0.27 5.42 -5.56 -0.95 -5.02 18.1 0.51 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 0.79 2.55 -2.14 -1.97 -2.76 10.4 42.6
GER 5-1 1.26 -0.47 0.08 -0.05 4.86 -7.56 1.20 -0.74 18.3 0.56 -0.36 0.11 0.03 0.84 2.29 -6.40 1.89 0.46 8.25 35.6
GR 5-1 1.27 0.07 -0.14 -0.25 2.60 1.57 -1.13 -1.64 1.8 1.19 0.08 -0.15 -0.24 0.18 2.43 1.88 -1.23 -1.52 1.61 2.7
IRL 5-1 0.67 -0.06 -0.03 -0.26 1.64 -0.83 -0.47 -4.74 10.0 0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.31 0.26 0.44 -0.18 -0.74 -5.49 3.60 22.6
IL 5-1 1.29 -0.22 0.14 -0.14 4.98 -5.26 2.11 -2.20 11.3 1.16 -0.17 0.10 -0.13 0.37 4.64 -4.21 1.61 -2.10 4.67 18.1
NL 5-1 0.85 -0.08 -0.03 -0.21 3.46 -1.41 -0.73 -3.91 8.8 0.18 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.70 0.85 -0.10 0.06 -2.24 11.3 39.6
NOR 5-1 1.36 -0.14 0.20 -0.18 3.78 -2.53 1.91 -2.45 5.0 1.08 -0.07 0.22 -0.16 0.34 3.08 -1.32 2.17 -2.25 4.77 12.7
POR 5-1 0.93 -0.23 -0.21 -0.09 2.11 -2.69 -1.57 -0.89 3.6 0.48 -0.20 -0.08 -0.12 0.43 1.15 -2.47 -0.63 -1.28 5.36 15.9
ES 5-1 0.89 -0.22 0.00 -0.01 3.64 -5.06 0.07 -0.17 8.4 0.58 -0.12 0.00 -0.02 0.50 2.59 -2.90 -0.03 -0.47 8.00 26.9
SWE 5-1 0.69 -0.22 0.00 -0.03 2.31 -5.07 -0.07 -0.72 8.3 0.40 -0.17 0.00 -0.02 0.34 1.37 -4.04 0.00 -0.46 4.83 15.8
CH 5-1 1.01 -0.14 0.08 -0.16 4.10 -2.19 1.22 -2.59 8.4 0.55 0.01 0.09 -0.13 0.74 2.58 0.20 1.62 -2.43 9.97 34.3
UK 5-1 0.94 -0.04 0.07 -0.43 4.04 -0.77 1.61 -4.99 9.9 0.63 -0.01 0.06 -0.46 0.49 2.72 -0.24 1.45 -5.55 4.77 17.1
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Table 8
Time-Series-Regressions of Earnings Momentum Portfolios
The table’s left panel gives the results of a regression according to equation (3) using 255 monthly returns ranging from January 1988 to March 2009 followed by the
according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to equation (5). We use the country abbreviations introduced in Table 1. We give
the quintile portfolios 1 (negative earnings revisions) to 5 (positive earnings revisions) together with the long-short portfolio (positive-negative earnings revisions).
Fama-French Model 4-Factor Model
α β γ δ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) Adj. α β γ δ ζ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) t(ζ) Adj.
R2 R2
1 -0.59 1.23 -0.09 0.14 -5.25 52.2 -3.16 3.73 92.8 -0.52 1.21 -0.08 0.12 -0.08 -4.54 48.5 -2.47 2.96 -2.50 93.0
2 -0.41 1.03 -0.23 0.10 -4.32 53.0 -9.32 3.04 92.4 -0.38 1.03 -0.23 0.10 -0.02 -3.98 49.7 -8.92 2.98 -0.65 92.5
3 -0.26 0.92 -0.34 0.03 -2.97 51.2 -14.8 1.06 91.5 -0.31 0.94 -0.35 0.05 0.06 -3.49 49.4 -15.1 1.76 2.48 91.7
USA
4 -0.05 0.94 -0.33 -0.16 -0.49 46.4 -12.6 -4.85 90.0 -0.13 0.98 -0.35 -0.11 0.11 -1.37 46.2 -13.6 -3.35 4.09 90.6
5 0.07 1.09 -0.24 -0.06 0.66 48.4 -8.5 -1.76 91.1 -0.08 1.14 -0.29 0.02 0.19 -0.78 52.4 -10.8 0.58 7.00 92.7
5-1 0.66 -0.14 -0.15 -0.21 5.09 -5.16 -4.26 -4.68 26.7 0.44 -0.06 -0.21 -0.10 0.27 3.73 -2.49 -6.75 -2.36 8.35 42.0
1 -0.40 1.20 -0.25 0.23 -4.52 55.1 -7.76 5.14 92.8 -0.25 1.18 -0.23 0.19 -0.12 -2.68 53.9 -7.49 4.42 -4.15 93.4
2 -0.22 1.08 -0.36 0.09 -3.45 69.1 -15.6 2.94 95.3 -0.17 1.08 -0.36 0.08 -0.04 -2.48 66.2 -15.4 2.50 -1.88 95.3
3 -0.04 0.97 -0.38 0.02 -0.59 63.4 -16.8 0.54 94.4 -0.05 0.98 -0.38 0.02 0.01 -0.74 61.2 -16.8 0.63 0.52 94.4
EUR
4 0.09 0.96 -0.37 -0.01 1.32 54.8 -14.2 -0.29 92.6 -0.04 0.99 -0.38 0.02 0.11 -0.58 56.3 -15.2 0.67 4.80 93.2
5 0.44 1.03 -0.24 0.12 5.21 49.9 -7.93 2.88 91.3 0.26 1.06 -0.25 0.17 0.15 2.98 52.8 -8.79 4.24 5.87 92.3
5-1 0.84 -0.17 0.01 -0.11 9.19 -7.70 0.26 -2.35 22.1 0.50 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.27 6.15 -6.05 -0.68 -0.59 10.8 46.9
A 5-1 0.53 -0.28 0.17 -0.06 1.96 -4.43 2.60 -1.16 8.8 0.35 -0.29 0.17 -0.02 0.27 1.35 -4.82 2.73 -0.49 5.37 17.9
BEL 5-1 0.77 -0.12 -0.01 -0.08 4.21 -2.41 -0.49 -2.00 3.5 0.40 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.35 2.36 -1.62 -0.71 -0.79 7.75 21.9
DK 5-1 1.16 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 4.35 -1.48 -1.04 -1.63 1.3 0.73 0.00 -0.09 -0.06 0.41 2.88 0.01 -1.34 -1.22 6.99 17.2
FN 5-1 0.97 -0.22 -0.05 -0.04 3.33 -4.59 -0.88 -1.24 7.8 0.53 -0.10 0.02 -0.03 0.42 2.04 -2.29 0.38 -1.19 9.28 33.0
FR 5-1 0.90 -0.22 0.06 -0.18 5.79 -6.68 1.28 -4.75 20.9 0.43 -0.12 0.09 -0.07 0.38 3.12 -3.99 2.16 -2.27 10.4 44.4
GER 5-1 0.83 -0.12 -0.04 -0.09 5.73 -3.62 -1.07 -2.47 5.5 0.51 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 0.26 3.84 -0.21 -1.80 -2.41 8.25 25.7
GR 5-1 0.33 -0.08 0.05 -0.10 1.03 -2.65 0.66 -1.00 3.5 0.34 -0.09 0.07 -0.09 0.08 1.03 -3.01 0.91 -0.83 1.61 5.1
IRL 5-1 1.38 -0.12 -0.06 -0.12 3.02 -1.42 -1.00 -1.89 2.9 1.27 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 0.28 2.86 -1.29 -0.74 -0.28 3.60 9.1
IL 5-1 0.31 -0.12 0.09 -0.03 1.58 -3.85 1.86 -0.63 5.5 0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.31 -2.34 1.39 -0.02 4.67 13.0
NL 5-1 0.95 -0.11 -0.05 -0.15 4.60 -2.43 -1.33 -3.42 10.2 0.55 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 0.49 3.20 -1.78 -1.11 -1.45 11.3 40.5
NOR 5-1 0.80 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 2.61 -4.20 -0.56 -1.05 6.9 0.47 -0.17 -0.10 -0.02 0.25 1.54 -3.57 -1.15 -0.35 4.77 14.3
POR 5-1 0.89 -0.06 -0.29 0.08 2.40 -0.85 -2.55 0.95 2.1 0.76 0.00 -0.24 0.10 0.31 2.12 -0.06 -2.22 1.24 5.36 15.0
ES 5-1 0.62 -0.20 0.01 0.03 2.75 -5.19 0.11 0.54 9.1 0.25 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.41 1.23 -3.08 0.11 0.70 8.00 27.5
SWE 5-1 0.84 -0.14 -0.01 -0.04 3.30 -3.75 -0.24 -0.95 4.2 0.67 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.25 2.71 -2.22 -0.23 -0.77 4.83 12.0
CH 5-1 0.63 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 3.53 -4.44 -0.32 -0.99 10.0 0.23 -0.15 -0.04 0.02 0.39 1.47 -3.81 -1.10 0.46 9.97 35.4
UK 5-1 0.63 -0.05 0.02 0.06 4.55 -1.92 0.64 1.18 0.8 0.47 -0.05 0.01 0.13 0.17 3.45 -1.71 0.29 2.61 4.77 8.7
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Table 9
Momentum and Information Uncertainty
The table gives return differentials of the price and earnings momentum hedge strategies by terciles of different
information uncertainty metrics. In Panel A we first sort stocks into five quintiles based on past returns. For each
quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on analyst coverage, size, total stock volatility and
idiosyncratic volatility. Below the return differentials we give t-statistics. The last two rows collect the number of
countries that exhibit the highest return differential among the respective terciles and the terciles mean ranking
in terms of returns. Panel B gives analogous results for earnings momentum.
Analyst Coverage Size Volatility Idiosyncratic
Country
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High
Panel A: Price Momentum
1.05 0.70 0.56 1.15 0.68 0.60 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.72 0.75 0.71
USA
4.79 3.03 1.86 5.01 2.92 1.98 3.63 3.76 3.12 3.68 3.60 2.96
1.21 1.34 0.77 1.72 1.07 0.87 1.15 1.01 1.21 1.06 1.00 1.17
Europe
4.77 6.29 3.40 5.93 4.81 3.65 6.84 5.93 4.97 5.67 5.56 5.00
-0.30 1.05 0.72 -0.17 1.08 1.07 0.97 1.01 0.63 0.91 0.84 0.91
Denmark
-0.60 3.15 2.01 -0.34 2.42 3.36 2.84 2.98 1.59 2.96 2.74 2.38
0.88 1.21 0.57 1.19 1.00 0.74 0.85 1.21 0.93 0.86 1.02 1.28
France
2.80 4.07 1.95 3.27 3.52 2.54 3.49 5.16 2.91 3.05 4.02 3.99
0.77 1.63 0.94 1.11 1.29 0.66 0.69 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.13
Germany
2.00 5.62 2.69 2.95 3.56 2.11 3.31 3.72 2.94 4.30 3.39 3.23
1.52 2.16 0.86 2.24 1.66 0.68 1.11 1.07 2.03 0.96 0.49 1.95
Italy
3.53 5.51 2.47 6.15 4.59 1.89 4.36 3.06 5.20 3.07 1.39 5.25
0.93 0.83 0.29 0.76 1.10 0.09 0.88 0.84 0.72 0.93 0.48 1.04
Netherlands
2.83 2.40 0.85 2.09 3.30 0.26 2.54 2.80 2.15 3.05 1.65 3.08
1.01 0.81 0.75 1.68 0.68 0.27 0.35 0.74 1.12 0.19 1.05 1.05
Spain
2.86 2.30 2.34 4.46 1.91 0.88 0.97 2.37 3.33 0.51 3.71 3.00
1.57 0.75 -0.03 1.41 0.23 0.03 0.52 0.21 0.03 -0.17 0.21 1.14
Sweden
3.78 2.16 -0.07 3.28 0.54 0.07 1.53 0.54 0.06 -0.41 0.57 2.80
0.98 1.06 0.89 0.95 0.87 0.84 1.66 0.87 1.15 1.48 0.76 0.90
Switzerland
2.47 3.62 3.04 2.50 2.70 2.71 5.15 3.44 3.43 3.89 3.04 2.79
1.20 1.13 0.52 1.38 1.10 0.50 0.76 0.87 0.97 0.67 0.89 0.98
UK
4.38 3.84 1.75 4.57 4.34 1.64 3.37 3.44 3.53 2.82 3.62 3.37
# max 5 6 0 8 3 0 3 2 6 1 1 9
ranking 1.73 1.45 2.82 1.36 1.73 2.91 2.18 2.00 1.73 2.27 2.27 1.27
Panel B: Earnings Momentum
0.77 0.48 0.20 0.78 0.49 0.27 0.59 0.58 0.41 0.59 0.50 0.47
USA
5.24 3.03 0.95 4.76 3.13 1.40 4.44 3.60 2.36 4.04 3.10 2.75
0.85 0.85 0.59 1.11 0.64 0.63 0.69 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.77 0.77
Europe
7.13 6.76 3.75 8.39 5.74 4.04 6.64 7.53 5.25 6.99 7.51 5.52
1.39 1.22 0.77 1.07 1.30 0.79 2.19 1.07 0.74 1.42 1.27 0.83
Denmark
3.06 2.40 2.00 1.43 3.88 2.65 2.18 3.73 1.84 2.33 4.44 2.15
0.42 0.69 0.72 0.53 0.58 0.75 0.69 0.50 0.67 0.76 0.81 0.58
France
1.86 2.82 2.75 1.85 2.45 3.15 3.46 2.36 2.44 3.79 3.67 2.08
0.65 0.99 0.60 1.20 0.78 0.35 0.77 0.85 0.56 0.75 0.81 0.71
Germany
2.64 4.65 2.37 4.28 3.62 1.65 3.79 4.95 2.20 4.06 4.36 2.66
0.18 0.53 0.25 -0.12 0.06 0.36 0.01 -0.01 0.35 0.05 0.66 0.05
Italy
0.62 1.55 0.88 -0.40 0.19 1.26 0.02 -0.03 1.01 0.22 2.50 0.12
1.15 1.31 0.04 1.34 0.97 0.21 0.86 0.44 0.89 0.48 0.41 1.30
Netherlands
4.14 4.38 0.12 4.56 3.25 0.53 3.04 1.62 2.61 1.91 1.59 3.84
0.72 0.57 0.14 1.00 0.07 0.60 0.25 0.41 0.74 0.32 0.19 0.79
Spain
2.22 1.69 0.39 3.05 0.22 1.67 1.01 1.27 2.32 1.03 0.63 2.33
0.69 1.02 0.57 0.74 1.46 0.00 0.79 0.86 0.87 0.69 0.54 1.25
Sweden
2.08 3.02 1.43 2.08 4.45 0.00 2.80 2.48 2.17 2.24 1.74 3.18
0.60 0.80 0.50 0.90 0.41 0.80 0.26 0.51 0.56 0.70 0.40 0.48
Switzerland
2.20 3.05 1.70 3.07 1.75 2.64 1.19 2.21 1.91 2.99 1.81 1.55
1.01 0.55 0.31 1.29 0.62 0.33 0.42 0.78 0.80 0.46 0.69 0.86
UK
4.98 2.53 1.65 5.53 2.97 1.72 2.55 4.42 3.45 3.01 3.89 3.73
# max 5 5 1 7 2 2 3 1 7 3 3 5
ranking 1.73 1.45 2.73 1.55 2.00 2.45 2.18 2.18 1.64 1.91 2.00 1.91
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Table 10
Momentum and Liquidity
The table gives return differentials of the price and earnings momentum hedge strategies by terciles of different
liquidity metrics. In Panel A we first sort stocks into five quintiles based on past returns. For each quintile the
stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on dollar volume, share turnover, the ILLIQ measure of Amihud,
and Liu’s measure. Below the return differentials we give t-statistics. The two last rows collect the number of
countries that exhibit the highest return differential among the respective terciles and the terciles mean ranking
in terms of returns. Panel B gives analogous results for earnings momentum.
Dollar Volume Share Turnover ILLIQ Liu Measure
Country
High Mid Low High Mid Low Low Mid High Low Mid High
Panel A: Price Momentum
0.57 0.66 0.82 0.62 0.58 0.69 0.62 0.64 1.08 0.62 0.50 1.11
USA
1.91 2.86 4.09 2.29 2.61 3.63 2.11 2.71 4.65 2.37 2.18 5.03
0.99 1.18 1.29 1.22 0.98 1.07 0.96 1.22 1.24 1.19 0.97 1.37
Europe
4.10 5.79 7.11 5.03 4.93 5.94 4.06 5.51 7.00 5.16 4.46 7.70
0.81 0.81 0.47 1.08 0.61 0.93 0.95 0.84 0.74 1.05 0.85 0.13
Denmark
2.57 2.23 1.25 3.08 1.79 2.57 3.13 2.15 1.62 3.18 1.90 0.26
0.69 1.05 1.28 0.80 0.97 1.11 0.76 1.10 1.13 0.77 1.10 1.15
France
2.43 3.92 4.00 2.93 3.45 4.09 2.72 3.95 3.75 2.81 3.94 4.03
1.11 0.98 1.31 1.31 0.81 1.14 1.07 1.06 1.24 1.18 1.01 0.92
Germany
3.44 3.16 3.95 4.09 2.67 4.17 3.13 3.15 4.07 3.68 3.46 4.06
1.13 1.34 0.65 1.34 1.04 0.95 0.96 1.23 1.16 1.28 1.07 0.74
Italy
2.98 3.78 2.02 3.69 3.02 2.94 2.88 3.64 3.85 3.71 3.57 1.66
0.25 1.09 0.52 0.59 0.59 0.86 0.24 1.09 0.85 0.30 0.88 1.09
Netherlands
0.74 3.19 1.49 1.83 1.77 2.48 0.68 3.19 2.41 0.88 2.67 3.36
0.65 0.43 0.88 0.68 1.04 0.18 0.54 0.68 0.77 0.79 0.68 0.41
Spain
2.05 1.41 2.78 2.12 3.46 0.56 1.78 2.10 2.07 2.50 2.33 1.07
0.14 0.28 0.86 0.15 0.23 -0.58 0.04 0.27 0.54 -0.10 0.61 0.02
Sweden
0.36 0.63 2.24 0.33 0.59 -1.30 0.09 0.67 1.43 -0.26 1.45 0.04
1.06 0.61 0.88 1.06 0.89 0.57 0.87 0.63 1.06 1.06 0.54 1.10
Switzerland
3.16 2.02 2.66 3.14 2.99 2.07 2.42 1.99 3.38 3.20 1.87 2.83
1.00 1.15 0.96 1.13 0.99 0.99 1.03 1.00 1.05 1.01 1.06 1.12
UK
3.45 4.33 4.06 4.20 4.03 3.85 3.74 3.51 4.41 3.71 4.32 4.37
# max 1 4 6 6 2 3 1 2 8 4 1 6
ranking 2.27 1.91 1.73 1.55 2.18 2.09 2.55 2.09 1.36 2.00 2.18 1.82
Panel B: Earnings Momentum
0.29 0.32 0.83 0.16 0.48 0.75 0.23 0.39 0.86 0.25 0.38 0.88
USA
1.46 1.93 5.26 0.83 2.85 5.21 1.20 2.30 5.36 1.33 2.22 6.60
0.66 0.79 0.83 0.85 0.65 0.81 0.67 0.78 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.84
Europe
4.28 6.71 8.02 6.01 5.36 8.37 4.53 6.81 7.50 4.93 7.02 8.78
0.95 1.88 1.73 1.00 1.66 2.06 1.23 1.56 2.50 1.23 1.85 2.08
Denmark
2.17 3.84 2.23 2.32 3.35 2.55 2.78 2.99 3.98 2.20 3.66 3.09
0.52 0.71 0.47 0.67 0.52 0.62 0.63 0.70 0.47 0.58 0.78 0.49
France
2.16 3.24 1.92 2.58 2.56 3.04 2.62 3.15 2.10 2.40 3.63 2.32
0.70 0.87 0.78 0.79 0.60 0.86 0.68 0.63 0.99 0.70 0.80 0.77
Germany
3.34 4.75 3.64 3.73 3.57 4.33 3.25 3.49 4.55 3.50 4.72 3.60
0.52 0.25 -0.43 0.58 0.01 -0.04 0.45 0.28 -0.24 0.45 0.14 0.09
Italy
1.93 0.91 -1.49 1.91 0.03 -0.16 1.75 1.09 -0.76 1.54 0.52 0.31
0.25 0.68 1.42 0.71 0.35 1.22 0.27 0.64 1.21 0.61 0.67 1.13
Netherlands
0.63 2.13 5.52 1.91 1.12 4.09 0.70 1.96 4.45 1.66 2.00 4.47
0.38 0.75 0.50 0.23 0.58 0.48 0.28 0.69 0.61 0.50 0.69 0.42
Spain
1.17 2.67 1.62 0.74 1.99 1.78 0.85 2.19 2.11 1.41 2.59 1.30
0.55 1.07 1.31 0.92 0.60 0.80 0.58 0.59 1.22 0.83 1.01 0.62
Sweden
1.32 3.13 3.54 2.12 1.73 2.45 1.46 1.78 3.34 2.00 3.72 1.73
0.35 0.80 0.43 0.57 0.75 0.31 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.47 0.77
Switzerland
1.20 3.17 1.64 1.89 3.02 1.29 1.76 1.78 1.75 1.30 1.97 3.29
0.74 0.82 0.72 0.80 0.72 0.67 0.84 0.77 0.72 0.68 0.78 0.73
UK
4.06 4.75 4.03 4.34 4.15 3.78 5.26 4.29 4.08 3.66 4.36 4.05
# max 1 6 4 5 2 4 3 2 6 1 5 5
ranking 2.64 1.45 1.91 1.82 2.27 1.91 2.27 1.91 1.82 2.45 1.55 1.91
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Fig. 1. Cumulative Momentum Returns: Quintile and Hedge Portfolios
The upper graphs give cumulative total returns of the winner and loser quintiles of the earnings momentum
strategy in terms of a highlighted spread while the returns of the price momentum winners and losers are added
as dashed lines. The performance of an equally-weighted market portfolio is given by the solid line. The lower
graphs give cumulative total returns of the price momentum strategy (dashed line) and to the earnings momentum
strategy (solid line). Results are for the period from January 1988 to March 2009.
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Fig. 2. Momentum: Fama-French versus Four-Factor Alphas
In the upper graphs, we plot trailing price momentum alphas arising from equations (3) and (4) using 36-month
windows, thus results cover July 1990 to June 2007. Likewise, the lower graphs give trailing earnings momentum
alphas arising from equations (3) and (5). The dashed line gives the Fama-French alpha and the solid line is the
respective four-factor alpha.
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